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Abstract:
The impact of the World Wide Web on basic operational economical components in global information-rich 
civilizations is significant. The repercussions force organizations to provide justification for security from a business­
case perspective and to focus on security from a Web application development environment standpoint. The need 
for clarity promoted an investigation through the acquisition of empirical evidence from a high level Web survey and 
a more detailed industry survey to analyze security in the Web application development environment ultimately 
contributing to the proposal of the Essential Elements (EE) and the Security Criteria for Web Application 
Development (SCWAD). The synthesis of information provided was used to develop the Web Engineering Security 
(WES) methodology. WES is a proactive, flexible, process neutral security methodology with customizable 
components that is based on empirical evidence and used to explicitly integrate security throughout an 
organization’s chosen application development process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The World Wide Web (WWW) instigated radical paradigm transformations in today’s global information-rich 
civilizations. Many of society’s basic operational economical components such as healthcare, government agencies, 
and financial services depend on Web-enabled systems in order to support daily commercial activities. E-commerce 
achieved global acceptance as a valid channel for conducting business. The total U.S. e-commerce spending in 
2010 reached $227.6 billion [comScore, 2011]. U.S. e-commerce sales for the second quarter of 2011 alone were 
$47.5 billion, which is an increase of 3 percent from the first quarter of 2011 [U.S. Department of Commerce, 2011].
The money spent on e-commerce applications to support this revenue stream is in the billions.
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PWC) [2011] survey indicates that organizations are reducing information security 
budgets or deferring security initiatives. Even though Deloitte’s [2010] survey indicates that budgets are not as large 
of an obstacle as in the past, it is still a major impediment for many organizations. The latest Computer Security 
Institute (CSI)/FBI survey [2010/2011] puts forth the idea that IT budgets may have been cut overall, but security 
expenditures were considered mandatory from an investment perspective. Complicating matters, Deloitte’s [2010] 
survey indicates that less than a third of their respondents “have established information security metrics aligned 
(with) business value(s) and report on a scheduled basis.” The economic, legal, and societal interest in the growth of 
e-business is creating a demand for a more secure Web-enabled business environment. Despite the critical role of 
security, in the potential growth of e-commerce, reports are continually produced by CSI/FBI [Computer Security 
Institute, 2009, 2010/2011] illuminating the fact that security breaches continue to cost organizations millions of 
dollars annually.
Over the past several years, security developed into a focal point of interest in industry. This is evident through the 
results of industry surveys and press releases focusing on security from large corporations like Microsoft [Bradley, 
2011] and IBM [2011]. The 2011 survey by Frost and Sullivan indicates that “application vulnerabilities represent the 
number one threat to organizations” [Ayoub, 2011]. They go on to indicate that 20 percent of the information security 
professionals in their survey were involved in software development.
The synergy of this information indicates that organizations need to approach security issues from a calculated and 
business-aligned perspective. This places additional pressures on Web Engineering applications to successfully 
integrate security into the development process. Web Engineering is:
.. the application of systematic, disciplined and quantifiable approaches to development, operation, and 
maintenance of Web-based applications [Deshpande, 2004, Deshpande, Murugesan, Ginige, Hansen, et 
al., 2002].
It is important to recognize that “Vanilla—Off the Shelf” Web Engineering methodologies do not inherently make any 
direct references to security. Consequently, today’s Web applications face increased susceptibility to major security 
problems.
Increasing academic and commercial discussions highlight the need for security integration into the software 
development lifecycle. This battle cry, echoed by many in the industry, generally fails to detail how this integration 
can be effectively achieved. The market is producing economic support for an idea, as quoted by Steven R. Rakitin, 
that W. Edwards Deming put forth several years ago stating that “[t]he quality of a product is directly related to the 
quality of the process used to create it” [Rakitin, 1997]. A major difference between Web application development 
and conventional software development is a greater emphasis on security [Deshpande et al., 2002]. Hence, the 
increase in costs associated with security issues should raise concerns over the way security is addressed in Web 
application development processes.
The research proposition is that an impartial security methodology applicable to different Web Engineering 
development processes will strengthen security. The WES methodology incorporates ideas from academic research, 
Web surveys, and qualitative open-ended industrial surveys. Prior to developing the methodology, a survey of 
professionals in a financial services company was carried out, which clearly identified some major problems with 
existing security processes and some lessons that could be learned. The results of this survey are included in the 
appendix to this article. WES supports the concept that software development methodologies must integrate security 
as a specific objective within all stages of the development process [Glisson, 2008]. WES also builds on existing 
research by addressing the criteria for fifth-generation security methodologies [Siponen, 2005a]. There are a wide 
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variety of published software development methods [Ramsin and Paige, 2008], and many organizations customize 
methods based on business need or use hybrid methods. Therefore, it would not be productive to define another 
completely new software development process; hence, WES is designed to be “process neutral.” The result is a 
practical, impartial security methodology that integrates security into an organization’s existing Web Engineering 
development methodology. This methodology was partially implemented in the same Fortune 500 financial 
organization in which the initial survey of professionals was conducted.
This article presents the Web Engineering Security (WES) methodology in its entirety which is described in detail in 
a Ph.D. dissertation [Glisson, 2008]. Previous publications have discussed specific aspects of the methodology but 
do not examine the entire process. Section II discusses relevant work. Section III covers the research methodology 
and previous work related to the development of the methodology. Section IV explains the Web Engineering 
Security environment. Section V explains the WES core principles. Section VI covers the WES lifecycle and Section 
VII discusses stakeholders and deliverables. Section VIII discusses WES goals, including industrial practicality, and 
Section IX discusses a practical application of WES. Section X provides a summary and describes future work.
II. RELEVANT WORK
In order to appreciate the current state of the security methodology research, it is necessary to acknowledge 
previous research in the field of information security design methods. Baskerville’s [1993] analysis separated 
numerous system methods into three generations. The first generation consisted of checklists and risk analysis. This 
stage focused on actual physical systems’ specifications. The second generation engineering methods focused on 
complex customization through the use of engineering concepts and mechanistic procedures that relied heavily on 
functional requirements. Baskerville cites Waters in his explanation of mechanistic engineering methods; stating that 
mechanistic engineering methods:
.. focus on the production of mechanical specification of input, storage, and output formats, along with 
details of procedures needed to transform input or storage into outputs [Baskerville, 1993].
Baskerville goes on to indicate that common tools implemented with these methodologies include system and 
program flowcharts, record layouts and print charts. Baskerville notes that the waterfall methodology [Royce, 
1987/1970] is an example of a mechanistic engineering application development approach. The second generation 
security development methods are summed up by Baskerville as top-down engineering, rapid prototyping system, 
and logical flowchart methods. This summary would include solutions like Fisher’s approach, Parkers’ security 
diagram, and the U.K. Government’s Central Computing and Telecommunications Agency’s (CCTA) Risk Analysis 
Management Method (CRAMM) [Baskerville, 1993]. The third generation of security methods are model-driven. 
Baskerville cited Structured Systems Analysis and Design Methods (SSADM) and the Logical Controls Design 
method as examples of third-generation security models. Even though Baskerville’s analysis of the security design 
methods did not directly examine the applicability of the security methodologies to the Web development, he did 
make an important point that is applicable to Web Engineering application development. Baskerville’s analysis did 
suggest that:
... systems methods will neither be trustworthy nor successful unless the general research regarding 
systems methodology incorporates security analysis design as an explicit objective [Baskerville, 1993].
Baskerville [1992] pointed out in a previous paper that security must be practical and feasible while mitigating, what 
he terms as conflict development duality. Baskerville described conflict development duality as the tension between 
developing a secure system versus a functional system.
Siponen [2005a] updates and expands on Baskerville’s analysis of information security development approaches 
declaring that there are five information system security generational classifications. Siponen arrives at his 
conclusion after an examination of the contributing research disciplines and an evaluation of seventeen modern 
information system security methodologies. Security is a highly diverse research subject that is an area of interest 
for a variety of disciplines. Siponen identifies four research communities as contributors to information security 
research, including Management Information Systems (MIS), computer science, software engineering, and 
mathematics. According to Siponen’s research, MIS accounts for the social and the organizational aspects of a 
problem. Computer science has a “positivist” [Hirschheim, 1985; Siponen, 2005a] orientation, which is understood to 
be the application of scientific methods, to solving computing problems. Software engineering uses both a positivist 
and an interpretive approach, while mathematics takes a quantitative approach to solve problems. An interpretive 
approach, in this context, is read to mean that the researcher is attempting to understand the data and the results 
generally within the social context and the context of the information system [Klein and Myers, 1999; Siponen, 
2005a]. The reality is that research from any of the contributing disciplines can be classified as interpretive or 
positivist depending on the specifics of the research. The evaluation of seventeen modern information systems 
contributed to the creation of the two additional security methodology generations.
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Siponen’s first three generations correspond with Baskerville’s generational classifications. Siponen [2006] explains 
that the first and second generations include checklist, management criteria, and maturity criteria. Checklist attempts 
to solve security problems through the identification and implementation of countermeasures via a list [Siponen, 
2006]. An example of a checklist is the Security Audit and Field Evaluation (SAFE) for Computer Facilities and 
Information Systems [Siponen, 2005b]. According to Siponen, the idea of standards evolved from checklists into 
recommendations that the organization should implement. Siponen [2006] explains that by meeting specific 
standards and/or achieving certifications, organizations are able to display a level of management and 
trustworthiness to business partners and customers. Some well-known standards in use today include the 
International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission standard (ISO/IEC) 
17799/27002 [27000.org Directory, 2014; ISO, 2012; Siponen, 2006], the Systems Security Engineering—Capability 
Maturity Model (SSE-CCM) [2003], and the Common Criteria (CC) [Common Criteria, 2012].
ISO/IEC 17799/27002 attempts to provide fairly comprehensive information security management recommendations 
in regards to initiating, implementing and maintaining systems that are concerned with information security 
[27000.org Directory, 2014]. ISO/IEC 17799 consists of several sections that contain information on everything from 
security policies to asset management, to human resource security, to business continuity management 
[27000.org Directory, 2014]. ISO/IEC 17799 does define information security in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability [27000.org Directory, 2014]. It should be noted that ISO/IEC 12207:2008 specifically addresses systems 
and software engineering lifecycle processes [International Organization for Standardization]. The standard tries to 
address a broader scope by examining aspects of the following areas: Project initiation and planning, Functional 
requirements, System design specifications, Build and document, Acceptance, Transition to production, Operations 
and maintenance support, and Revision and system replacement [Hansche, Berti, and Hare, 2004].
SSE-CCM [2003] presents a document-intensive, best practices, highly structured model solution designed to 
support statistical process control to all forms of software engineering. The SSE-CCM version of the lifecycle 
includes concept, development, production, utilization, support, and retirement stages. This all-inclusive approach is 
composed of twenty-two processes. The first eleven process areas focus on security and the last eleven focus on 
“project and organizational activities” [SSE-CMM, 2003]. The process areas that focus on security provide a high 
level initiative telling organizations what to address. For example, under Coordinate Security, they indicate that:
... all members of the project team are aware of and involved with security engineering activities to the 
extent necessary to perform their functions [SSE-CMM, 2003].
This statement focuses on the team, not the methodology being used. The CC attempts to fuse an assortment of 
international standards into a set of evaluation criteria to be utilized against information technology products [Rothke, 
2004].
Siponen defined the third generation as consisting of structural and object-oriented security methods, information 
modelling methods, and stepwise security methods. He also indicates that the third generation is focusing on 
modelling information system security requirements. Third generation security models would include approaches like 
the Spiral Approach, the Logical Approach, Data Flow Diagrams (DFD), and Entity Relationship (ER) modelling. 
According to Siponen, the fourth generation builds on the third generation by addressing the social and socio- 
technical aspects of the methods. The term socio-technical was originally coined by Bostrom and Heinen [1977] in a 
paper in which they were examining Management Information Systems (MIS) project failures. They described an 
organization work system as being comprised of two components: the social and the technical. Bostrom and Heine 
went on to explain that the technical aspects focused on the task, the processes, and the technology. While the 
social side of the system is focused on people attributes, relationships, reward systems, and authority structures. 
Basically, the social component is concerned with the management aspect of the business. Bostrom and Heinen 
[1977] defined the socio-technical perspective as an intermediate position between the two extremes. Siponen gives 
the Survivable IS approach as an example of a fourth generation methodology.
The fifth generation, of security methodologies, that Siponen [2005a] discusses is really the next generation of 
methodologies. This implies that the fifth generation security methodologies do not currently exist, a point which he 
also articulates in a later article [Siponen, 2006]. Siponen describes four criteria that the fifth generation security 
methodologies should strive to achieve. These criteria are as follows:
• Integration with all types of software development methodologies
• Painless adaptability of security methods with practitioners
• Provide empirical evidence of their usefulness [Siponen, 2006].
• Use of social ideas and techniques ensuring congruent design and user expectations
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Siponen, Baskerville, and Heikka [2006] did propose, develop, and test a Meta-Notation solution for secure 
information design methods. In this research, they defined six meta-requirements as a way to analyze secure 
information systems. However, it has been argued that security is more than notation and modelling. Secure 
application development is both technical and social [Mouratidis, Jürjens, and Fox, 2006]. Secure application 
development does not end when testing is completed. It needs to take into account implementation into production 
and end-user feedback. Siponen and Heikka [2008] provide a critique of several secure information systems design 
methods from a modelling perspective. The ability to model data from a security standpoint is advantageous. 
However, the approach to modelling should be based on the needs and the capabilities within individual 
organizations. Siponen’s points, regarding the fifth generation, brings us to the heart of the security problem. There 
have been few industrial attempts to comprehensively address user-focused aspects; methodology integration; 
practitioner malleability, and employment of Web Engineering Security throughout the Web-based application 
development process via the establishment of a comprehensive security methodology.
The need for information security is attributed to several factors ranging from the enormous interconnection of 
assorted and distributed systems, the existence and availability of sensitive information, computer crime anonymity, 
the lack of geographic boundaries, and the absence of forensic evidence [Joshi, Aref, Ghafoor, and Spafford, 2001]. 
Baskerville [1993] noted the lack of security in development methods. Baskerville [1993] recognized that third- 
generation information systems development methodologies lacked security considerations. This problem still exists 
today. There is a lack of security methodologies that are compatible with existing application development 
methodologies. Siponen’s [2005a] analysis only found three approaches that could be smoothly integrated in 
information systems development methodologies. According to Siponen [2005a], these methodologies are 
Baskerville’s logical approach [1989], Booysen and Eloff’s spiral approach [1995], and McDermott and Fox’s abuse 
case methodology [1999]. Siponen and Baskerville point out that Agile methodologies “have few features specifically 
addressing security risk” [Siponen, Baskerville, and Kuivalainen, 2005]. Baskerville, Ramesh, Levine, Pries-Heje, et 
al. [2003] discussed the implications of Internet-speed development for software management which does not 
specifically mention security. They suggest that “... development speed is paramount,” hence, “Quality becomes 
negotiable...” [Baskerville et al., 2003]. However, security should be negotiable based only on an in-depth risk 
analysis.
Security is inherently not a part of “Vanilla—Off the Shelf” Web engineering development processes, and this 
inherent lack of security encourages environments that are susceptible to exploitation via potential breaches. Web 
Engineering methodologies do not make any direct references to security, consequently today’s Web applications 
face major security problems. Therefore, an improved definition of Web Engineering Security modifies Deshpande’s 
explanation of Web Engineering [Deshpande, 2004, Deshpande et al., 2002] as follows:
Web Engineering Security is the systematic, disciplined, and quantifiable amalgamation of security with a 
Web-based application development process.
A specific Web Engineering Security methodology provides a road map for developers and management to follow 
during a Web-based application development project. A methodology attempts to provide guidance for all of the 
various aspects of security during the individual stages of the application development process. In order to allow 
organizations and individuals to preserve and capitalize on existing Web application development capabilities, and 
possible market advantages, a process neutral approach was explored. The phrase “a process neutral approach” is 
chosen to convey the idea that the design of the security methodology endeavors to seamlessly integrate with a 
variety of existing Web application development methodologies.
A process neutral approach to the implementation of security is based on the fact that organizations use a variety of 
methodologies during their Web application development projects. This variety ranges from the traditional Waterfall 
approach, or some variant thereof, to agile approaches in order to support Web application development. A process 
neutral approach provides an organization with the opportunity to support its existing Web application development 
methodology regardless of the style of the methodology. It also complies with Siponen’s recommendation that new 
methodologies should strive to integrate with all types of software development methodologies [Siponen, 2005a].
The process neutral approach provides a roadmap for organizations that are using a more traditional methodology 
for Web application development from a deliverable perspective. The number of deliverables that an organization 
will require depends on the culture of the organization, the methodology that the culture is comfortable with 
implementing and, to a large extent, the regulatory impact on the business. Businesses that are more conservative 
in nature, and under a large amount of regulation, such as a large financial institution, are going to require 
deliverables at every stage of the development process. On the other hand, smaller businesses are more inclined to 
be agile in nature and require fewer deliverables during each stage of the development process. A process neutral 
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approach allows a methodology greater flexibility to support agile methodologies. The Agile community’s manifesto 
states that:
We are uncovering better ways of developing software by doing it and helping others do it. We value:
• Individuals and interactions over processes and tools.
• Working software over comprehensive documentation.
• Customer collaboration over contract negotiation.
• Responding to change over following a plan.
That is, while there is value in the items on the right, we value the items on the left more [Agile Alliance 
Organization, 2007; Fowler and Highsmith, 2001].
In order to support the agile community’s manifesto, a new security methodology needs to be flexible enough to 
integrate with existing Web application development methodologies in order to meet the needs of specific 
organizations. At the same time, it needs to encourage interaction among project members. This increased 
interaction among all of the individuals involved in the project, over security issues, raises the overall security 
visibility of the Web application while supporting software deliverables. The security methodology needs to 
encourage customer input into the security aspect of the Web application. The flexibility of the methodology provides 
the implementing organization the freedom to decide on the amount of documentation that is appropriate for the 
Web application being developed and the culture of the organization. The overall flexibility of the methodology allows 
the implementing organization the capability to decide the rigidity of the methodology. Pursuing a process neutral 
approach attempts to support the ideals of the agile manifesto along with providing the flexibility to integrate into 
traditional application development methodologies.
Direct contributions of individuals involved in Web development projects provide the fundamental ingredients for a 
project’s ultimate success or failure. This is especially true in the security arena. The methodology should support 
the individuals involved in the development process by providing guidance so that the end product is a secure Web 
application, while meeting the needs of the customer and business. This necessity for versatility supports research 
into a process neutral approach in order to allow appropriate customization while meeting the needs of the individual 
stakeholder groups.
III. PREVIOUS WORK RELATED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WEB ENGINEERING 
SECURITY METHODOLOGY (WES)
This section presents the research methodology and summarizes the authors’ previous published work that 
motivated and informed the development of WES. The research presented in this article was conducted from a 
pragmatic perspective. As Walsham [2006] noted, “... action research represents a highly involved type of research 
study.” This involvement made it an ideal approach to investigate building security into large-scale application 
development projects. Action research is characterised by focusing on practical issues, placing an emphasis on 
change, interactive cycles, collaborating with practitioners, and encouraging multiple data generation approaches 
along with practical and academic outcomes [Oates, 2006]. Four data collection methods were used in this research: 
(1) relevant literature review, (2) Web survey, (3) interviews, and (4) participatory observation. Relevant literature 
was gathered at the start of the research to help understand the overall problem. A Web survey was conducted to 
gain a boarder perspective of the issue. In-depth one-to-one interviews were conducted to understand the issues 
within a large financial organization. The researcher was embedded in the organization for a year and a half to 
complete the project. This immersion into the organization helped the researcher understand how the organization 
worked from a pragmatic perspective. The research strives to discover an effective solution to the integration of 
security into large-scale development projects based on the means available in the organization, the constraints of a 
multi-faceted environment, and the fluidity of a working development environment. The WES methodology was 
developed, implemented, and evaluated in the organization. The results of the research were presented to both 
industrial partner management and academic audiences.
Previous work by McDonald and Welland on Agile Web Engineering gave us some insight into the problems of 
developing commercial Web-based applications [McDonald, 2004; McDonald and Welland, 2005]. We developed 
our initial ideas on the structure of WES based on a literature survey of security problems in software systems 
[Glisson and Welland, 2005]. To improve our understanding of specific problems in Web Engineering Security, we 
carried out two surveys that provided further evidence to inform the refinement of the WES process.
The first of these was a Web-based survey that identified several elements that organizations were failing to address 
when considering a Security Improvement Initiative (SII) for Web development projects. The detailed results of this 
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survey were reported in the Web Survey Technical Report [Glisson and Welland, 2007b] and summarized in a 
previous paper [Glisson and Welland, 2007a].
The five essential elements indentified in this survey were:
EE1. Web Application Development Methodology. Before security can be addressed in an organization’s Web 
application development process, there needs to be an application development methodology in use within the 
organization. The work on AWE addressed this issue [McDonald, 2004; McDonald and Welland, 2005].
EE2. Web Security Process Definition. There needs to be a clear organizational definition of security and its 
impact on the business, Web applications, and the development process. This informs the definition of a 
development process that integrates appropriate security measures into the existing development process in 
order to produce a more secure end-product. This motivated our work on WES.
EE3. End -users Feedback. In many organizations there is a lack of end-user feedback in the internet, intranet and 
extranet development processes. McDonald and Welland [2005] previously advocated strong support for end­
user participation in Web application development. McDonald [2004] carried out an evaluation of an existing 
internet banking user interface using a random sample of members of the public. This revealed a significant 
number of simple problems that were addressed within a week and re-evaluated with a different random 
sample, which showed that the interface had been greatly improved. No attempt had previously been made to 
test the interface with real end-users.
EE4. Implement and Test Disaster Recovery Plans. Our survey revealed that about half of the respondents’ 
organizations had a disaster recovery plan, but only about half of these had been tested in the last twelve 
months. The growing importance and continued vulnerability of Web-based applications mean that 
organizations need to consider risk management and business continuity through disaster recovery planning. 
Organizations have to make hard decisions on exactly how much risk they are willing to accept and exactly 
how much money they are willing to spend to achieve the agreed upon level of security [Glisson and Welland, 
2006a].
EE5. Job-related Impact. The survey revealed that the majority of the organizations do not have a job-related 
impact for not following the security development process. There needs to be a job-related impact associated 
with security process compliancy. Employees need to understand that there is a job-related impact for not 
following organizational processes. This becomes even more important when considering security.
The second survey was based on one-on-one interviews with a range of employees within a large financial services 
organization. The details of this survey and the interviews are given in Appendix 1. This survey was conducted in the 
same organization as the research for the Agile Web Engineering (AWE) process, and the new results from the 
application development part of the survey support previous findings [McDonald, 2004]. This survey sample 
consisted of various employees representing a variety of roles with a diversity of work experiences within the 
technical side of the organization. The detailed results of this survey were reported in the WES Application Survey 
Technical Report [Glisson and Welland, 2006] and analyzed in a previous paper [Glisson, McDonald, and Welland, 
2006b].
The survey identified six Security Criteria for Web Application Development (SCWAD):
SC1. Active organizational support for security in the Web development process. Active managerial support 
for security in the Web development process is critical. Without the support of management, there is no hope 
for effective integration of security within the development process.
SC2. Proper controls in the development environment. The term proper controls is a very broad term that 
encompasses policies, knowledge, technology, and processes. These controls are a necessity, and they help 
to provide structure to the development environment.
SC3. Security visibility throughout all areas of the development process. Security must be visible throughout 
all areas of the development process. The survey findings indicated that there was a problem with visibility 
due to the fact that, after design approval, there is no verification that the implemented design matches the 
approved design.
SC4. Delivery of a cohesive system, integrating business requirements, software, and security. The goal of 
any development process should be to deliver a cohesive system, integrating business requirements (needs), 
software, and security. This means that the security requirements of the business need to be identified as 
early as possible in the development process so that they can be incorporated into the design and the 
construction in order to produce secure software.
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SC5. Prompt, rigorous testing and evaluation. The development process must include rigorous end-user 
relevance testing and evaluation. Testing is critical to the success of an application. Testing should be 
conducted from a design and programming perspective. Testing must take into consideration how much is 
realistically achievable with available resources and within tight timescales.
SC6. Trust and Accountability. The development process should encourage the development and maintainability 
of trust and accountability within the organization. Trust and accountability really make up the heart and soul 
of security.
A Web Engineering Security methodology needs to exist within an organizational framework that actively supports 
security both within the development process and more widely across the whole organization. Therefore, before 
discussing the core principles of a Web Engineering Security methodology, the organizational environment within 
which the methodology exists needs to be considered.
IV. WEB ENGINEERING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
A Web Engineering Security process exists within an organizational structure, and it is essential that the culture of 
the organization embraces all aspects of security. A Web Engineering Security process, like any other development 
process, is of little use if it is not embedded in a supporting environment.
The essential features of this environment include good communication, security education, and cultural support. 
These principles are interdependent and need to work in concert in order to achieve and maximize the desired effect 
from a security perspective. This concept is illustrated in Figure 1—The Security Environment.
The implementation of these concepts within a specific organization can be achieved through the execution of 
individual or a combination of theories. How a particular organization chooses to achieve these goals is dependent 
on the culture of that company. As Ahmad Al-Omari et al. [2012] note, several theories have been proposed in the 
area of information security awareness. D’Arcy and Hovar [2009] explored the effects of counter-measures in terms 
of general deterrence theory, Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, and Benbasat [2010] investigate factors that impact employee 
compliance with information security policies, along with the impact of information security awareness and employee 
attitudes. The result from their study indicate that an employee’s attitudes, beliefs, and self-efficacy impact their 
intention to comply with information security policies. Research in the area of security training has been conducted 
by several researchers, including Puhakainen and Siponen [2010], Karjalainen and Siponen [2011], and D’Arcy, 
Hovav, and Galletta [2009]. While these papers propose different solutions to address security training, education, 
and behavior in organizations, all of the papers agree that security policy noncompliance is a major threat to an 
organization’s security. Puhakainen and Siponen’s [2010] findings also “indicate that visible support of IS security by 
top management is necessary to ensure that users comply with IS security policies.”
Figure 1. The Security Environment
Security Education
The Organization for Internet Safety (OIS) publishes Guidelines for Security Vulnerabilities Reporting and Response 
[2004]. These guidelines highlight the fact that any flaws in the system design or application coding can potentially 
lead to security vulnerabilities. This means that security education should cover an array of issues, including 
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knowledge transfer, coding practices, technical attacks, social engineering attacks, security processes, everyday 
activities, and potential impact analysis methods.
This problem is emphasized due to the availability and accessibility of Web applications. Hence, designers and 
developers must be educated on common development flaws, best coding practices, and the implementation of 
practical development solutions. Security should not be left to the acquisition of the functional and non-functional 
security requirements. Security is more than a technical issue; it is a people, a process and an educational issue that 
must be addressed in its entirety. Organizations need to encourage knowledge transfer among employees and 
provide for proper training. As Niekerk and Solms [2004] noted, “Employees must know why information security is 
important and why a specific policy or control is in place.” They go on to break information security education into 
three areas: awareness, training, and education. Awareness highlights information security to focus an employee’s 
attention. Training is used to impart necessary competencies and skills while education integrates competencies, 
skills, and specialities into a universal collection of knowledge.
Education is an important area of the security process. Security education should not only include raising awareness 
of the different types of technical attacks and social engineering attacks [Mitnick, 2002], but it should also include 
information about the current environment. Expanding on Siponen’s [2000] idea that security guidelines must be 
justified, along with understanding relevance, employees should know with whom they should discuss security, how 
it fits into their everyday work environment (i.e., their development process), and the potential impact security 
imposes on the Web application solution that they are implementing.
Good Communication
Good communication is a critical component of the environment, as it is needed to assure solution cohesiveness 
within the development team and within the organization. In order to cut down on possible confusion and to ensure 
that everyone is communicating properly, organizations should define:
• What security means to the business
• What it means to a Web application
• What it means in the development process
• What a Web Engineering Security development process entails
Good communication helps to provide the foundation for security visibility throughout the entire application 
development methodology. Hence, good communication should encourage security visibility through the 
development process, an auditable process, a clear understanding of the defined metrics, the delivery of a cohesive 
system, and the dissemination of the importance of the integration of development and security methodologies.
In order to achieve these goals, there needs to be good communication within the organization. This includes good 
communication between management and the development team, among members of the development team, 
between the development team members and the stakeholders from the business unit, and between the 
development team and end-users. The communication between management and the development team is needed, 
due to the fact that management is responsible for setting the policies, standards, and procedures to which the 
development team must adhere.
Development Team Communication
Communication should be encouraged and fostered in the technical side of the organization. The organization’s 
management, in concert with the infrastructure architects, need to provide a security vision for the future. This can 
be communicated in the present through the creation of current and future standards. This support and integration 
with communication is a critical component for the purpose of driving future security initiatives in an organization. 
The marketing and dissemination of this information is necessary to effectively implement this initiative. If your 
employees do not know about the tools that are available, they will not use them. It is also true that if the tools and/or 
methods are not effective in completing the job, are too complicated to use effectively, or are just not user friendly, 
then employees are likely to avoid using them.
If the tools or the methods are not productive for various reasons, then the individual members of the development 
team should be encouraged to suggest alternative tools or methods to be evaluated. A channel for communicating 
feedback to management for both positive and negative communication needs to be established in the organization. 
If this channel is not established, then developers will inevitably use their own tools to complete the job. Their 
decisions, realistically, could range from using off-the-shelf solutions to open source software. Off-the-shelf software 
could put the organization in jeopardy from a legal perspective. This idea is supported by investigations into the 
integration of legal requirements into methodologies [Compagna, Khoury, Krausová, Massacci, et al., 2009]. Then
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there are legal implications when software is sold for personal use and used in a commercial environment. On the 
other hand, open source software could introduce potential security breaches into the organization.
The interaction between management and the developers helps to introduce and sustain flexibility in the Web 
application process. More importantly, it gives the development team a sense of ownership in reference to the 
methods and the tools that are used in the development process. Along with this interaction, all the tools and the 
methodologies that are used in the development process need to be reviewed frequently. This review helps to 
ensure that the tools and the methodologies are achieving the desired goals. Baskerville et al. [2003] advocate the 
practice of “tailoring the methodology daily” when doing Internet speed development and also discuss the use of 
different methodologies for different releases of a system. One of the twelve principles of Agile Software in the Agile 
Manifesto [Beck, 2001] is: “At regular intervals, the team reflects on how to become more effective, then tunes and 
adjusts its behaviour accordingly.” For example, the Scrum process [Schwaber and Sutherland, 2011] includes a 
review meeting at the end of every iteration, called the Sprint Retrospective, which includes encouraging the Scrum 
Team to “improve its development processes and practices.” Developers should also be encouraged to share 
technical knowledge with each other. This distribution of information encourages debate on technical solutions and 
distributes application knowledge through the group. This distribution of knowledge helps keep a balance in the 
group, thereby reducing dependency on individual employees.
Stakeholder Communication
Communication with the business unit stakeholders is needed to acquire the appropriate application requirements. 
Security solutions must also be confirmed with these stakeholders. This communication directly impacts the potential 
effectiveness of a security solution. The security that is implemented should meet the needs of the organization so 
that it adds value to the end product and to the overall business process. Essential elements that contribute to good 
communication include a clearly defined application development methodology and a clearly defined Web security 
development process. Business stakeholders must be explicitly included throughout the security development 
process.
Baskerville et al. [2003] observed that customers are “implanted” in all phases of the development environment in 
Internet-speed development in order to deal with fuzzy and rapidly changing requirements rather than relying on 
formalized requirements management processes. One of the twelve principles identified in the Agile Manifesto 
[Beck, 2001] states that “Business people and developers must work together throughout the project.” For example, 
XP [Beck and Andres, 2004] uses the concept of the “on-site” customer as part of the development team.
End-user Communication
Balfanz, Durfee, Smetters, and Grinter [2004] state “Usability must be designed into systems from the beginning of 
the development process and this is particularly true for usability of security.” They also warn against the security 
experts’ belief that security is more important than any other users’ needs, including whether the user can actually 
use the security mechanisms. This means that system designers and security specialists must be aware of end­
users’ capabilities and perceptions. In an intranet or extranet system development, where the user community is 
homogenous, it is possible to identify representative groups of users who can be consulted about end-user needs 
and perceptions of security during system development. These groups can also be involved in system testing and 
evaluation of the delivered product. However, it is more difficult to identify such representative samples of end-users 
for an Internet application that includes the general public.
Cultural Support
Cultural support should drive the efforts in security and education along with the efforts in good communication. 
Cultural support for security should embrace confidentiality, integrity, and availability throughout the management 
structure. Active organizational support for security in the Web development process is critical. Without the support 
of management, there is no hope for effective integration of security within the development process. Managerial 
support for security needs to be both proactive and reactive. Management needs to be proactive by supporting 
employees, hence, giving them the necessary tools and developing the necessary policies so that employees can be 
successful in their endeavors. This would include proper controls for the development environment such as software 
versioning controls, providing up-to-date code libraries, setting the policies for testing code and for establishing trust 
and accountability within and outside of the organization.
Likewise, management needs to be reactive by stating and enforcing job repercussions if employees do not follow 
security practices within the development process or the development process in general upon which the security 
process depends. One solution would be to provide positive and negative reinforcement. The idea is to reward 
individuals who adhere to the security process. An example would be to provide monetary rewards to programmers 
based on the amount of secure code they produce, not the total amount of code that they generate. On the other 
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side of this issue, there needs to be repercussions for individuals who do not follow the organization’s security 
development process. Another idea is to tie security to the employees’ yearly evaluation [Wylder, 2004].
Security Synergy
The environment that is most conducive for fostering security in the Web application development environment is the 
intersection of all three principles. The intersection of security education and practicing good communication should 
help build confidence in the overall security of the organization, the general security knowledge of the employees 
and encourage compliance with organizational policies. The distribution of security information and how that impacts 
the daily activities of employees helps to provide practical solutions to security issues. This approach helps to 
propagate the concept that security needs to be viewed in the application development process as “everybody’s 
problem” [Graff and van Wyk, 2003]. Integrating security responsibilities and security education into the development 
process increases employee confidence in addressing security issues and sends the signal to the development 
group that security is an important issue.
A metric system should also be developed that helps the organization determine the success of the development 
process security initiative. This should include issues such as general security education, training, monitoring, and 
tracking all development bugs. This will help the organization determine if it is actually delivering a cohesive system 
that integrates the business, the software, and the security perspectives.
V. WEB ENGINEERING SECURITY (WES) CORE PRINCIPLES
The Web Engineering Security (WES) methodology was designed to complement Web software development 
through customer communications, short development cycles, and practical security solutions to business problems 
[Agile Alliance Organization]. WES attempts to achieve this by stressing core principles while providing a general 
outline with customizable subcomponents. These core principles have been distilled from our earlier work and 
relevant literature.
Process Neutrality
WES is designed to be process neutral, which means that it can be integrated with an existing process for Web 
application development. The objective is to ensure that security considerations are integrated into every phase of 
the development process. The WES process strengthens security in a Web application development environment by 
implementing a security process that integrates seamlessly into an organization’s development process capitalizing 
on existing synergies. In practice, organizations have invested, to varying degrees, money, time, and staff training 
into their own Web application development methodologies. The variety of application development processes found 
within organizations ranges from traditional Waterfall to completely Agile, or some hybrid of these approaches. A 
customizable security neutral methodology provides an organization with the opportunity to support its existing 
investment in its chosen Web application development methodology regardless of the implementation details. This 
seamless integration places the responsibility for defining the process stakeholders and the process deliverables 
within individual organizations implementing the WES process.
Security Visibility
Security should be visible in all steps of the development process if it is to be implemented with any success. This 
implies that the development process needs to be security focused. The term security focused translates into the 
use of effective and efficient designs, good coding practices, addressing security issues such as authentication and 
authorization issues, having specific security testing criteria, and acquiring feedback from the end-user that is 
security specific. This means that the process encourages secure practices such as acquiring specific security 
requirements, infrastructure re-use, re-usable components, coding standards, coding practices, end-to-end data 
security, secure designs, and takes into account security policies, procedures, and standards.
Delivery
The goal of any development process should be to deliver a cohesive system, integrating business requirements/ 
needs, software, and security. This means that the security requirements of the business need to be identified as 
early as possible in the development process so that they can be incorporated into the design and the construction 
in order to produce secure software. As Balfanz et al. [2004] noted: “The security community has long argued that 
security must be designed into systems from the ground up; it can’t be ‘bolted on’ to an existing system at the last 
minute.”
The incorporation of security into the development process should be as seamless as possible. The security that is 
implemented should meet the needs of the organization so that it adds value to the end product and to the overall
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business process. The application development must be effective when considering time to market, rapid application 
deployment needs, introduction of new technology, and efficiency.
Prompt, Rigorous Testing and Evaluation
Testing is critical to the success of an application. Testing should be conducted from a design and programming 
perspective using both automated and manual scripts; design and code reviews; black, white, and grey box testing; 
and end-user testing. Testing should also take into consideration as much as is realistically achievable. This could 
include penetration testing and possibly bringing in external testers (ethical hackers) to validate application security, 
when the risk is deemed appropriate for such an action. End-user testing translates into the process of being 
accountable for the security requirements, the environment, and the practicality of the solution from the end-user’s 
perspective. Actual end-users, not surrogate end-users, need to be used in the testing and evaluation of the 
application. End-users will perform operations, submit data, and interpret instructions in ways that the development 
team, the business team, or the technical staff within an organization could never dream! This is also true from a 
security perspective. The end-users of a Web application may be restricted to employees (intranet) or employees 
and trusted third parties (extranet) or include the general public (Internet).
Observing employees potentially reveals security issues and application problems that could be manipulated into 
contributing to a security breach. It could be argued that employees are not always forthcoming with information, 
especially if the lack of security or the potential security vulnerability either does not directly affect their duties or 
actually helps them to accomplish their assigned tasks. Therefore, a multiple stream approach consisting of 
involvement in testing, observation, and consultation is recommended when working with systems that will be used 
by employees. Similar considerations apply to extranet systems that include trusted third-party employees.
There is extensive general guidance on designing usable Web applications [Travis, 2009; U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2006] and ensuring accessibility [W3C, 2008], and this applies to the security aspects of an 
interface. Testing the security aspects of applications designed for use by the general public is much more difficult 
than intranet applications, as it is necessary to balance usability for the genuine customer, probably with limited 
computing expertise, and the security requirements to prevent malicious access (hacking). The concept of 
considering end-users in the security aspect of the application development process is not new. Saltzer and 
Schroeder [1975] identified eight “useful principles that can guide the design and contribute to an implementation 
without security flaws.” One of these was “Psychological Acceptability: It is essential that the human interface be 
designed for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply protection mechanisms correctly. Also, to 
the extent that the user’s mental image of his protection goals matches the mechanism he must use, mistakes will 
be minimized.” Saltzer and Schroeder’s viewpoint is from the perspective of minimizing mistakes through the human 
interface design, which is a valid point, but it does not specifically address end-user involvement in testing or 
evaluation.
Balfanz et al. [2004] identified five general lessons for usable, secure systems design. One of these is “Keep your 
customer happy.” They state that the target audience must be involved in testing and evaluating the system and that 
a small population of subjects will provide useful input. However, they do not discuss how to choose these subjects. 
This is a major problem for Internet applications. It would be possible to seek existing customers to participate in 
testing and evaluation, perhaps offering some incentive to take part. However, such a group may not be 
representative of the general customer base; they will be more committed and probably more comfortable with 
technology than the majority of end-users. Another possibility is to use a random sample of people, not necessarily 
business customers, offering a small incentive to take part in a one-off evaluation. Such a sample provides a spread 
of technical abilities, but few of the subjects, if any, will have any knowledge of the business context. End-user 
testing could be contracted out to a third party. There are commercial organizations that offer usability testing of 
Web applications, including security aspects, and will recruit a panel of general users for testing, in addition to 
providing expert opinion about usability issues.
End-user Feedback
If a development process does not attempt to acquire feedback from the end-users, this could signal potentially large 
problems with the development process alignment with the needs of the business. Lack of feedback directly impacts 
the potential effectiveness of a security solution. Hertzum, Jørgensen, and Nørgaard [2004] carried out a usability 
study on six e-banking systems in Denmark. They identified a major problem with the installation of e-banking 
software by end-users and suggested that most end-users had no “real understanding of the involved security 
issues.” Therefore, they simply followed a sequence of instructions without being aware of potential pitfalls. For 
example, three of the e-banking systems did not explain nor enforce the use of strong passwords.
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End-users should be observed and consulted for information on the effectiveness of the implemented security 
solution. Useful feedback can be collected by automatically gathering and analyzing data from support functions 
(e.g., online technical support or help desk) regarding security problems. This can be used to identify changes 
required in future releases of the system and provide development staff with a general understanding of end-user 
capabilities. Balfanz et al. [2004] state, “Support questions provide another window into what users find difficult or 
unintuitive, and all of this information can feed back into redesign iterations and implementation and interface 
refinement.” They also point out that collecting this type of data will provide useful input for the design of future 
systems; it could be treated as ‘Lessons Learned’ within the system development process. Existing research 
[Balfanz et al., 2004; Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975] coupled with the results of our previous work strengthens the 
case for an organization to seek end-user feedback from a security perspective.
Implement and Test Disaster Recovery Plans
Security is really a risk management game in today’s society [Viega and McGraw, 2005]. In today’s Web-enabled 
environment disruptions are measured in minutes, not hours [IBM Global Services, 1999].
The logical progression, once the risk and cost decisions have been made, is to address the need for a disaster 
recovery plan. There are a multitude of reasons for developing and implementing a disaster recovery plan. These 
reasons not only include the obvious technical attacks on an organization’s website, as reported by The Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) [2004], but also natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and information security 
breaches. Possibilities that have been blatantly exhibited recently include Stuxnet [Fildes, 2010]; Floods in Australia, 
Sri Lanka, and the Philippines [Kroeger, 2011]; and the Japan earthquake which triggered a Tsunami [BBC, 2011].
These events stress the need for organizations to have and test a disaster recovery plan. If the organization does 
not have a disaster recovery plan, then it is difficult to develop a cost effective secure design solution for a Web 
application.
Trust and Accountability
The development process should encourage the development and maintainability of trust and accountability within 
the organization. Trust and accountability really make up the heart and soul of security.
Trust
Trust can be defined as “Firm reliance on the integrity, ability, or character of a person or thing” [Dictionary.com, 
2005]. It is the foundation for a good relationship because it realistically adds value to the communication that takes 
place in the relationship [Kaplan, 2004]. Hence, Kaplan’s reference to Gerick’s explanation of trust is that “trust is not 
transitive, distributive, associative, or symmetric except in certain instances that are very narrowly defined” [Kaplan, 
2004]. This information is of key importance to understanding the overall concept of trust. Establishing trust is the 
heart of security, for without trust you cannot rely on the information that is presented. A major component in gaining 
trust is to manage risk and then implement appropriate controls, educate employees, and monitor effectiveness 
[Kaplan, 2004]. A tried and true approach to identifying risk is a risk assessment initiative. Hence, trust should be 
identified in the risk assessment and mitigated in the design to establish and maintain trust. Since nothing is truly 
risk free, the goal is to mitigate the risk so that it is at an acceptable level. Hence, it is imperative that the 
development process takes risk into consideration. This is typically done via a risk analysis. The earlier this is 
completed in the development process, the better.
Accountability
If the heart of security is trust, then the soul is accountability. Without accountability in a system, there is no security, 
just as, in life, without a soul there is no person. Accountability is critical to the enforcement of security. Individuals 
have to be successfully identified and authenticated in order to be held accountable for their actions through the use 
of logs and the effective implementation of access methodologies. The effective establishment of trust and realistic 
implementation of accountability controls should be visible within the organization’s security policy, the application’s 
design, coding practices, coding standards, application testing, and project feedback, as a project progresses 
through the application development lifecycle.
VI. WES LIFECYCLE
The Web Engineering Security (WES) methodology, as shown in Figure 2—WES Methodology, starts with a Project 
Development Risk Assessment. The Project Development Risk Assessment is the initial phase and it examines the 
security risk associated with the implementation of a project. The Application Security Requirements phase 
examines the requirements from the customer’s perspective within the framework of organizational compatibility. 
Security Design/Coding examines the architecture, the solution design, and the coding practices that are 
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implemented to meet the requirements. A Controlled Environment Implementation scrutinizes the application’s 
interactions with the entire environment before specific aspects of the application are examined.
Testing is critical to the success of many applications. This hypothesis holds true in the area of security as well. 
Testing not only includes the examination of code but incident management and disaster recovery as well. 
Implementation of the application in a production environment should take place only after successfully completing 
testing. End-user evaluation is used to establish the success of the application’s security features and for security 
maintenance.
The WES methodology implicitly supports the concept of separation of duty between everything that happens before 
testing and everything that happens after testing. This is demonstrated through the color of the line, the line style, 
and the directional arrows displayed in Figure 2—Wes Methodology. The ideal situation is that the developers and 
the testers who work on the project are not the same individuals who implement the project into production. 
Depending on the size of the organization, this may not be possible. Regardless, once code migrates from the test 
environment to the production environment, it should not be allowed to return to testing without going through 
another iteration of the process.
Figure 2. WES Methodology
After Implementation in Production, end-users should be consulted in an attempt to determine the usability of the 
security solution, suitability of the security solution, and to help identify any security issues that need to be resolved. 
Once this information has been attained, the process should start the next iteration of the WES development 
process. Ideally, the iterations in the process should be concise. Succinct iterations encourage smaller, frequent 
code releases which, by nature, means that less code is introduced into a system at a single point in time. Injecting a 
smaller quantity of code into an existing system, in theory, denotes that smaller chunks of code are being tested at a 
single point in time. This potentially allows testers to focus in detail on smaller amounts of code and hopefully 
improve security test results.
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Project Development Risk Assessment
The purpose of the risk assessment is to identify any risk associated with the development of the proposed 
application functionality. An excellent definition of risk is:
... risk is a measure of the loss of what you consider valuable, the impact of losing it, the threats to those 
assets, and how often those threats could be successful [Tiller, 2004].
This would include examining appropriate data protection legislation that might apply to your organization’s 
application. There are several tools and suggested practices available in the market for conducting risk analysis. 
These tools include Cobra [C&A Systems Security Limited, 2012], the Facilitated Risk Analysis Process (FRAP) 
[Peltier Associates, 2005], and the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) 
developed at Carnegie Mellon [Alberts, 2003]. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) publishes 
recommendations for conducting companywide risk analysis on its website [Peltier, 2000].
If an organization-wide risk analysis is conducted periodically, then the information in the analysis can be used as a 
starting point for the application risk analysis. The reverse is also true. Information from the individual application 
analysis can be used as an initial guide to organizational analysis. The risk assessment piece of the methodology 
can be customized to work in conjunction with an organization’s existing risk analysis processes. The basic idea is 
to:
• Detail critical functions
• Determine the necessary service levels in doing so, identify possible threats, and outline their 
motivating factors
• Estimate the probability of an attack
• Estimate the probability of a successful attack
• Outline the cost of providing protection [Ellis and Speed, 2001; Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 2003;
Phaltankar, 2000]
The answers generated from researching the statements above should help answer the following questions 
reproduced from Ozier’s work: “What could happen? (What is the threat?); How bad could it be? (What is the impact 
or consequence?); How often might it happen? (What is the frequency?); and How certain are the answers to the 
first three questions? (What is the degree of confidence?) The key element among these is the issue of uncertainty 
captured in the fourth question. If there is no uncertainty, there is no ‘risk’, per se” [Ozier, 2004].
Application threats can cover a wide range of possibilities including human errors in coding, user errors, external 
attack, fraudulent individuals, technical sabotage, acts of God, and disgruntled employees—all of which should be 
accounted for in the risk assessment [Ellis and Speed, 2001]. After conducting the risk assessment, the specific 
application security requirements need to be determined through in-depth conversations with the stakeholders and 
evaluation of organizational compatibility. Organizational compatibility determines how well security requirements fit 
into the frame work of an organization. The general areas that make up this category include security policy 
compatibility, corporate culture compatibility, and technical compatibility.
By conducting a Project Development Risk Assessment, the business and the information technology group can 
analyze each stage of the development by identifying the associated risks. This would include determining the states 
of the application and how they can be used or misused as the case may be. This step provides an opportunity for 
the organization’s development team to understand the application from a risk point of view and helps to generate 
appropriate questions to address the application security requirements phase. Depending on the size of the 
organization and the market requirements, both the governmental and commercial perspectives, the risk analysis 
can be used to help identify known risks, point out new risks, and ensure that these risks are acceptable. Depending 
on the needs of the organization, this can be either a very formal process or a very informal process. If it is a formal 
process, then the advantage for management is that it presents a clear understanding of the risks before a 
substantial investment is made in the development of the Web application. The disadvantage of a highly formalized 
process is that it can slow down the development process. In reality, there will be a lot of cross-over communication 
between the Project Development Risk Assessment stage and the Application Security Requirements stage. 
Informal processes tend to be faster but introduce more risk through a potential lack of environmental and risk 
understanding. The deliverables that could possibly be generated at this stage include a formal project risk analysis 
document, a risk analysis document used to gather end-user requirements, and a document detailing high-level 
issues for design and testing.
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Application Security Requirements
Specific application security requirements have to be acquired from the stakeholders. The project risk analysis 
should be used to help gather the security requirements by generating a series of questions and responses that filter 
the desires of the stakeholders into a list of detailed needs. The Application Security Requirements phase allows the 
development team to make a specific effort to acquire the security requirements through effective communication 
with the stakeholders. Hence, the stakeholders involved in this stage would probably include the business unit and 
the technical staff. They should coordinate these requirements with the organization’s security compatibility 
constraints. The security compatibility constraints encompass several important issues that include security policies, 
standards, baselines, procedures, guidelines, the corporate culture, and existing technology. For the purposes of 
this article, the terms listed in Table 1: Terms have been taken directly from The Security Policy Life Cycle: 
Functions and Responsibilities by Patrick D. Howard [2004]. Once these requirements have been captured, they 
should be examined against the organization’s security policy, the corporate culture, and technical compatibility.
Security Policy
“The goal of an information security policy is to maintain the integrity, confidentiality and availability of information 
resources” [Hare, 2004]. Policies, standards, baselines, procedures, and guidelines can assist in large organizations 
to provide cohesiveness within the organization. In smaller organizations, where it is not mandatory through 
regulation, they can be implicit to the organization. The policy provides the “what” and the standards, baselines, 
procedures, and guidelines provide the “how” [Hansche et al., 2004]. They can work in concert to support the 
organization from a security perspective. The security policy encompasses all business interactions providing overall 
guidance to protecting resources [Premkumar and Devanbu, 2000]. This includes acceptable computing practices, 
all interactions with the network, Internet, messaging, and business specific applications or services [Ellis and 
Speed, 2001]. Companies may need to meet security policy standards requirements like the ones put out by the 
International Standards Organization (ISO) [ISO, 2012]. In the context of Web development, the main area of 
concentration, with regards to the security policy, would be application compatibility within the corporation. However, 
all areas would need to be addressed to ensure overall compatibility. The security policy should be a living 
document and updated as new architectures and applications are developed [Symantec, 2005]. If a security policy 
does not exist at project inception, then the organization may need to investigate the validity of creating the 
appropriate document.
Table 1: Terms [Howard, 2004] _ENREF_53
Policy: A broad statement of principle that presents management’s position for a defined control area
Standards: Rules that specify a particular course of action or response to a given situation
Baseline: A platform-specific security rule that is accepted across the industry as providing the most 
effective approach to a specific security implementation
Procedures: Define specifically how policies, standards, baselines and guidelines will be implemented in a 
given situation. Procedures support policies, standards, and baselines.
Guidelines: A general statement used to recommend or suggest an approach to implementation of 
policies, standards, and baselines
From a legal perspective, it is important to recognize that a company’s policies, standards, baselines, procedures, 
and guidelines should be compliant with relevant legal obligations. Cyber-crime is a reality that cannot be ignored in 
today’s global business environment. The ramifications from a financial perspective and a legal perspective are 
potentially enormous. Web application security needs to be incorporated into the entire development methodology. 
This includes upfront acknowledgement of the potential legal implications involved with the development and 
deployment of the Web applications. Effective security resolutions need to acknowledge the legal ramifications that 
the application introduces to the company and the attendant risks need to be mitigated to the organization’s 
satisfaction. For this reason, a checklist of relevant legislation could be helpful. The purpose behind the checklist is 
not to introduce a debate over the legislative or the legal enforcement challenges that computer crime presents. Nor 
is it to discuss the effectiveness of the current legislation or potential conflicts between legislation enacted in 
different countries. The point is to acknowledge the increasing global legislation that is developing due to the 
growing impact of the World Wide Web on everyday life, on business economical environments, and on national 
importance. The legislative list provides a snapshot in time of current relevant legislation. Due to the dynamic nature 
of legislation, it is understood that the list will continue to change over time as the Web integrates into the global 
environment. Economies continue to integrate with the Web to produce and/or provide goods and services. 
Societies continue to increase dependence on the Web to help provide basic operational economical components. 
This increasing dependency introduces potential national security risks. Therefore, societies are demanding a more 
secure World Wide Web which leads to the continued creation of new, and the refinement of existing, security 
legislation. The ripple effects and the overall impact of security legislation on the global economy are unknown.
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Corporate Culture
Corporate culture needs to take everything into account, ranging from employee security awareness programs, to 
employee education on social engineering attacks (discussed below), to recognition of organizational norms. 
Corporations need to educate the application end-user employees and their development staff in terms of security. 
They also need to remind employees periodically about security policies, standards, baselines, procedures, and 
guidelines. One approach to this is to make the issue important to the employee by integrating it into their annual 
evaluation [Wylder, 2004]. This will not solve all of an organization’s security problems; however, it does provide an 
avenue for encouraging good security practices [Wylder, 2004].
Corporate culture needs to be examined from several different perspectives that include managerial acceptance of 
the importance of security, the threat of social engineering, employee perception of security and security habits, and 
technological acceptance of cultural norms. Managerial acceptance and habits, from a cultural standpoint, are 
critical to the success of security within an organization. Large businesses, looking to strengthen security in their 
corporate cultures, need to have the highest possible ranking champion promoting the change. In small 
organizations, the change should be introduced by the owner. If management takes security seriously and 
encourages a secure environment through their actions, then the odds of this having a positive trickledown effect to 
employees within the organization are good.
Technology Compatibility
Existing technology needs to be examined from two viewpoints; a compatibility point of view and a value-added point 
of view. When an application is being proposed, the solution needs to be compatible with the existing infrastructure 
in the organization. Does the technical expertise exist in the organization to write the application in the proposed 
language? Does the hardware infrastructure support the new applications? Is the existing code repository 
compatible with the development of the new application? There are both hard and soft costs associated with these 
types of questions that need to be taken into consideration when considering any new application development.
Technology needs to be examined from a value added point of view. Whether or not you subscribe to the individual 
aspects of the “value configuration(s)” [Afuah and Tucci, 2003] which include the value chain, the value shop, and 
the value network, one of the goals of the organization is to provide added value regardless of the product or service 
that is being offered [Afuah and Tucci, 2003]. Technology is a major contributor to this goal in today’s marketplace. 
Hence, when examining the validity in developing a new application, the organization should be asking how this will 
help them add value to their organization.
In general, the area of technological compatibility deals with an organization’s existing applications, software 
compatibility, legacy systems, and the acquisition of new software and technology [Boman, 1997]. When considering 
the technical compatibility of a system, it is necessary to consider the existing employee skill set within the company. 
To implement a technical solution, does the necessary skill set exist within the company, can it be acquired easily 
through employee training, or will it require the company to acquire the necessary skills though outsourcing? To 
answer these questions, an in-depth analysis will need to be conducted and compared with the solution’s 
requirements. Technological compatibility, from a security standpoint, needs to examine the application to see if it is 
compatible with existing security solutions already in production. An example would be a new application that is not 
compatible with the company’s existing single sign-on solution. If a solution requires new technologies, the 
organization should rate the security capabilities of the new technologies and determine if they meet the company’s 
security standards out of the box. If they do not, can they be brought up to speed and at what cost?
This does not mean that these are the only areas that can contribute to this category or that they all have to be 
present within this section to ensure compatibility. There are environments that may choose not to implement a 
security policy or to investigate corporate culture due to the size of the company. For instance, a large financial 
institution will probably have all three categories (security policy compatibility, corporate culture compatibility, and 
technical compatibility) documented to some extent. However, a small family-run business, like a local restaurant, 
probably will not have a security policy and the culture in that business will be implicit. However, more than likely, 
they will have technical compatibility issues that they will need to address.
Security and the Human Element
Technical solutions alone will not provide protection against the human element. They will not provide protection 
against an end-user who reveals his/her passwords, users who circumvent security to complete a specific task, or 
insider attacks [Ellis and Speed, 2001]. When it comes to information security “the human factor is truly security’s 
weakest link” [Mitnick, 2002]. This fact spawned an area of warfare in the business world known as social 
engineering.
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Social engineering attacks take place when an outsider or insider observes an organization, gathers information, 
and makes necessary business contacts under the premise of a legitimate purpose in order to gather information 
[Mitnick, 2002]. This information is then used to acquire more information until the intruder acquires something of 
value [Mitnick, 2002]. The same tactics can be used by a current employee to gain unauthorized privileges. 
Company employees need to be educated on the existence of social engineering attacks and how to identify and 
prevent these attacks from occurring [Mitnick, 2002].
The perception of security, and its importance to the business, needs to be effectively communicated at an 
employee level. If the employees do not place a great deal of importance on security and they regularly post 
passwords on screens or in accessible areas, trade passwords with colleagues, or grant system access to outside 
vendors, then they are creating a security risk for the company.
Technological acceptance of corporate norms occurs when an implemented solution becomes accepted and then 
becomes expected. The implementation of single sign-on is an easy example. The implementation of a single sign- 
on solution for several existing applications could reasonably influence employee expectations for future 
applications. The justification for going against expectations needs to be examined and justified to the employees. 
Otherwise, employees could start to circumvent security when it suits their needs.
Security Design/Coding
Once the application security requirements have been determined, the next issue that needs to be addressed is 
security design. The design of the application needs to consider the overall architecture, the application design, and 
good design principles.
This information then allows the technical architect, in the Security Design/Coding phase, to pick the most 
appropriate technical controls from a design, risk, and cost perspective. Once the high-level design decisions have 
been made, then the coding takes place. The programmers should take into consideration coding standards, good 
coding practices, code reviews, and appropriate security measures. Encouraging programmers to adhere to coding 
standards and to pursue good coding practices will increase the code readability which will inherently improve 
software maintenance. This improvement should be felt in both enhancement maintenance and patch maintenance. 
Estimations indicate that maintenance accounts for an average of 60 percent of an application’s software expense 
[Glass, 2003]. In reality, “better software engineering development leads to more maintenance, not less” [Glass, 
2003]. If an application meets the needs of a particular market, then the application will be enhanced through the 
addition of new features and improved functionality. It should be noted that this is considered new development in a 
lot of organizations. Patch maintenance is another area that is critical to defending against cyber vulnerabilities 
[Dacey, 2003]. Any improvement in an organization’s software maintenance capabilities translates into long-term 
savings.
Code reviews ensure that the code is doing what it is supposed to do, decrease errors in the code and ensure that 
more than one person understands the application. The implementation of the type of code review is up to the 
individual organization. Code reviews can encompass everything from pair programming, to design reviews, to 
manual reviews of written code. It is up to the organization to decide the best avenue for implementation so that the 
organization is not dependent on a single employee for modifications and support for a specific application. Applying 
appropriate security measures will help ensure data security and security consistency throughout the application.
The architecture needs to fit into the existing organizational environment. There are several issues that need to be 
addressed within the realm of architecture. Some of those issues are:
• Application layers [Fernandez, 1999]
• Application maintainability [Graff and van Wyk, 2003]
• Information compatibility from a data transfer standpoint
• How strongly typed the language needs to be [Lipner, 2004]
• Approach to privileges, i.e., role-based or inheritance
• The approach to default privileges from the application and the user’s standpoint [Pfleeger and 
Pfleeger, 2003]
• Security in-depth-use passwords and another mechanism, such as an encrypted key of some sort, for 
determining object access [Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 2003].
The design of the application needs to address:
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• The language that will be used [Lipner, 2004]
• Ease of use—the easier security solutions are to use, the less likely that they will be circumvented 
[Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 2003]
• Authorization techniques
• The use of encryption algorithms
• The establishment of trust
• The establishment of accountability
It should be noted that the establishment of trust should link back to the project risk assessment. The amount of trust 
that is designed into an application is directly related to the amount of risk that an organization is willing to tolerate 
and the total cost that they are willing to absorb. Accountability, through the implementation of appropriate 
mechanisms, is an essential ingredient to security.
The design needs to examine the code from common attack standpoints and implement the appropriate controls to 
ensure secure data. A professional code-management system should be used by the development team to ensure 
accountability, within the team, and provide a means of roll back [Foster, 2004]. After design selection, the solution 
is coded. During coding, the developer should be cognizant of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) coding 
standards and pursue secure coding practices [W3C, 2005]. One idea that a designer should keep in mind, when 
designing a secure solution, is to balance the need for a secure application with the need for a particular 
functionality.
Another idea that a designer should strive to attain is the creation of simple design solutions that solve specific 
problems and fit into the applications global architecture. The design will depend on the level of security the 
customer is willing to accept from a risk and/or cost standpoint.
Controlled Environment Implementation
Depending on the needs of the organization, the Controlled Environment Implementation can be as complex as 
implementing it into an environment that mirrors the production environment, or it can be as simple as running the 
application on a desktop. In the latter case, both the desktop application installation and the server mirroring 
environment can be used to test the security controls. The point here is to release the code in a secure environment 
that simulates the production environment for compatibility testing before the application is made available to the 
general public. The goal of the environment is to minimize surprises. Basically, this phase allows the developers to 
test the application’s compatibility with the operating system and interfacing programs before application testing and 
a production release.
The controlled environment implementation should also take into consideration application compatibility, load testing 
and regression testing. The new application compatibility with the native operating system and other pre-existing 
applications is important. Compatibility also needs to be verified with applications on the same server and 
applications that live offsite (internal to the organization or external to the organization) where data is being 
exchanged.
Security Testing
Testing takes place from both the developer and the end-user perspective. Developers should be running their own 
battery of tests when the code is conceived. Again, it should be stressed that the methodology is designed to work in 
conjunction with existing organizational tools and processes. If the organization already utilizes automated testing 
tools, they should be used in this stage to augment the testing process.
Actual end-users should be incorporated into the testing campaign whenever possible. The stakeholders should be 
writing test scripts and actively interfacing with the application to ensure that the program is performing accordingly. 
End-users’ participation in the security testing of the Web application holds the process and the solution accountable 
from a practicality perspective.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) estimates that “93% of reported vulnerabilities are 
software vulnerabilities” [Ounce Labs, 2004]. The Organization for Internet Safety (OIS) publishes Guidelines for 
Security Vulnerabilities Reporting and Response. In this document, they define a security vulnerability as:
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..  a flaw within a software system that can cause it to work contrary to its documented design and could be 
exploited to cause the system to violate its documented security policy [Organization for Internet Safety, 
2004].
Hence, any flaws in the system design or application coding can potentially lead to security vulnerabilities. The Open 
Web Application Security Project (OWASP) provides an excellent listing of the top ten vulnerabilities in Web 
Applications. The top ten vulnerabilities are taken directly from the OWASP report and include Un-validated Input, 
Broken Access Control, Broken Authentication and Session Management, Cross Site Scripting (XSS) Flaws, Buffer 
Overflows, Injection Flaws, Improper Error Handling, Insecure Storage, Denial of Service, and Insecure 
Configuration Management [The Open Web Application Security Project, 2004].
This list complements information discussed in the previous articles, the “Top Web application security problems 
identified” and “The Bugs Stop Here” which were published in 2003 [Berinato, 2003; Mimoso, 2003]. Only when 
testing requirements are satisfied and the vulnerabilities have been addressed to the satisfaction of the organization 
should the application be moved into production.
Developers need to examine their code independently and the program as a complete entity in order to determine 
possible misuse from a functional standpoint. That is, programs should do precisely what they are designed to 
accomplish.
Vulnerabilities can stem from the rapidly evolving use of software, in which programs meant for a limited 
purpose are applied in ways not anticipated by their developers [Williams, Shimeall, and Dunlevy, 2002].
Thus, can a program be manipulated in a manner that might create problems, and can this be stopped or mitigated? 
A primary example is an email server that is used to propagate a virus or used in a denial of service attack.
Testing is critical to the success of any application. Testing should cover application testing, incident management, 
and disaster recovery plans. Application testing includes validation errors, program behavior testing, and code 
analysis. This will involve implementing appropriate programs to test static and runtime code, penetration, and 
application scanning. Automation, where possible, of the testing process will help provide stability. Testing should 
also involve executing scripts from both the developer and the end-users to test the application. An important part of 
the testing phase should be to decide appropriate action plans for incidences. When there is an issue, what are the 
procedures that need to be implemented to resolve the situation? This should also include amending the disaster 
recovery plan where appropriate. If the organization does not have a disaster recovery plan, then, they should 
investigate the creation of a plan. The disaster recovery plan on the organizational level should be a living 
document. The disaster recovery plan for the application should be flexible enough to allow for the addition of a new 
functionality. The disaster recovery plan should be tested after the initial creation and each amendment. Testing is 
where everything should come together in the development process. Hence, testing should:
• Contain a requirements check against the application to ensure initial and continued fulfilment.
• Ensure sufficient mitigation of threats identified in the risk analysis.
• Be as prompt as is reasonably possible so that an organization is competitive in the Web application
development market.
• Involve actual end-users, not surrogate end-users.
• Be as comprehensive as possible. This will be determined based on the amount of risk the application
presents to the organization’s reputation and the organization’s core business.
• Be tailored for security.
• Take advantage of an organization’s existing testing infrastructure.
• Should include external testing to verify application security where the risk warrants the expense.
• Implement a matrix to measure the success of the testing and effectively track bugs.
Implementation into Production
After testing is complete, then and only then is the application prepared for Implementation into Production. The 
introduction of the application into the production environment needs to be completed with the involvement of the 
appropriate security personnel. Appropriate personnel need to be present to ensure proper application deployment 
into the production environment. If possible, this allows for immediate issues resolution at the time of 
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implementation. If issues are discovered after the application deployment into production, then the application must 
go through the process again and be re-implemented into production.
End-user Feedback
End-user Evaluation is critical from the standpoint of security. Whenever it is possible, actual end-users should be 
used in the security evaluation of a Web application. End-users are the ultimate variable in the execution of an 
application. If end-users are circumventing the application’s security in order to make their lives easier or perform 
their jobs in a timely manner, then these issues need to be investigated and resolved [Glisson and Welland, 2005].
An efficient and effective response to application security breaches is mandatory to Web-based business survival. If 
the application is compromised due to a flaw in the design or the code, then the security issue needs to be 
addressed, realistically, as rapidly as possible. If the application is not secure, businesses run the possibility that the 
application will be abused, corporate credibility lost, and financial consequences incurred.
End-user Evaluation involves both communicating with the user to determine the success of the application’s 
security and security maintenance. This can range from informal communication, to surveys, to structured interviews 
with the end-user. Security needs to find a balance between usability and providing a secure environment.
Security maintenance focuses on discovering vulnerabilities after a production release. As new technologies emerge 
from the viewpoint of development and maintenance, new vulnerabilities will be created, uncovered, and these 
issues will have to be addressed to maintain application security [Lipner, 2004; Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 2003]. 
Patches will need to be tested to ensure that they resolved the newly discovered issue and to ensure that they do 
not create new security vulnerabilities in the application.
VII. WES STAKEHOLDERS AND DELIVERABLES
The stakeholders who are involved in a specific project obviously depend on several criteria ranging from resources 
to project visibility, to project risk, to funding. A large organization is more likely to have the resources available to 
assign different people from different areas to the project. A small company, on the other hand, may have 
employees conducting multiple job functions.
Project visibility is a factor when considering the amount of resources that will be assigned to a specific project. High 
profile projects affect many people within and/or outside of the organization. Hence, they will probably receive more 
attention than low-profile projects.
The risk associated with the profile is another matter. A project that is high profile and high risk to the core business 
function of the organization will potentially be assigned more resources. An example of this is a website that 
conducts financial transactions for a banking institution. On the other hand, a high-profile and a low-risk project, such 
as an intranet phone book application, will potentially be allocated fewer resources.
As always, funding is an issue with all projects. If the funding is not available, regardless of the size of the 
organization, then resources will simply not be assigned to the project. If funding is available, at a smaller amount 
than initially requested, then corners are cut to reduce expenditures. Easy targets for reducing expenditures include 
security testing, ongoing end-user input and feedback, and developer security education and training, but this is 
potentially a dangerous strategy.
General stakeholders who would be expected to be involved in the development process would include the project 
sponsor, project manager, business analysts, architect, programmer, tester, risk and security personnel, release 
personnel, and the end-user.
After methodology customization satisfies the needs of a specific business, it can then be documented for future 
project replication. Depending on the needs of the organization, this can serve also as an audit trail. The amount of 
documentation implemented will depend on the needs of the particular organization. For example, a financial 
institution, due to regulations, will be required to provide detailed documentation of their processes. In contrast, a 
small local business will probably document only the bare necessities in order to conduct business.
The deliverables that are required, during each stage of the Web Engineering Security development process, 
depends on the culture of the organization and the development methodology being implemented. A highly 
regulated industry, such as banking or insurance, will require a greater emphasis on the individual deliverables at 
each stage of the process. However, the converse is also true; an organization not in a highly regulated business will 
have fewer deliverables that are required during the various stages of the process.
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The application development methodology, that the organization is utilizing for Web development, is usually linked, 
as well, to the culture and the industry to which the business belongs. An organization that uses a waterfall approach 
will be more inclined to generate documentation and specific deliverables between the various stages. However, an 
organization that is implementing an agile approach to application development will, by nature, produce fewer 
deliverables between the various stages. Understanding the previously mentioned issues, the decision as to whether 
to create deliverables and to what extent the deliverables are created is left to the organization to determine.
VIII. WES GOALS
The WES goals include upfront integration of security, security comprehensiveness, structured security 
implementation, and industrial practicality.
Upfront Integration of Security
The WES methodology strives to integrate security from the beginning of the application development process. This 
is why security discussions are initiated during the business analysis stage of the development process. This up­
front integration should help the organization reap benefits ranging from faster application development to positive 
effects on budgets and time frames by proposing realistic security solutions at the onset of the project. The idea is to 
move security from the typical viewpoint of an inhibitor to that of an enabler in the eyes of the end-user.
Granted, this move is, to some extent, dependent on the security team that is involved in assisting in the 
implementation of the WES methodology. They need to not only be defining what is possible in the current 
organization but to also provide an architectural strategy for the future while providing realistic alternatives to 
business needs rather than stating that something is not possible, full stop.
Security Comprehensiveness
The WES methodology hopes to address the questions of “How do I build application security into the fabric of my 
company?” [deJong, 2006]. The solution is to approach the problem from the idea of presenting a proactive 
comprehensive approach to the security development process. The security methodology should be compatible with 
the existing application deployment process capitalizing on current core competencies while providing a roadmap for 
improving security during the application development process.
Structured Security Implementation
The WES methodology provides an overall structure that allows organizations to customize the level of security to its 
individual needs and implement security into their application development process. This structure can then be 
hardened to provide an organization with the desired level of continuity, reusability, and audit-ability for future 
development projects.
Industrial Practicality
The general categories in the WES methodology are not set in stone but are strongly recommended. The items 
within the categories will need to be tailored and, where necessary, expanded to meet the specific needs of the 
individual organization and their current policies and procedures. The methodology is designed to complement an 
organization’s current methodology, while providing guidance to the development process from a security 
perspective.
The WES methodology provides a roadmap for Web application development that will help guide organizations to a 
more secure system. The goal is to proactively help developers create applications that are secure by design. 
Following the WES methodology means that the development process takes into account risk analysis, application 
security requirements, various organizational policies, organization architecture, code design and coding practices, 
proper testing procedures, and end-user feedback.
WES provides a practical method by which to address security. There are several solutions in existence that tell you 
“what” to do to improve general security within an organization and some within the organization’s development 
process. There are currently a multitude of technical solutions that offer possible solutions to very specific questions 
which basically answer “how” to solve specific security problems. The technical contribution is growing rapidly daily.
Prior to the WES methodology, nobody designed a security process based on criteria that are specifically tailored to 
address the needs of a Web Engineering development process. The general solutions that have been proposed in 
the past tend to lack accurate details that address the practical issue of “where” actions should be performed in the 
software development process. WES provides the Web Engineering community with a practical methodology to 
solve the inherent security deficiencies present within generic Web development lifecycles.
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IX. WES PRACTICAL APPLICATION
WES was implemented in a Fortune 500 financial organization as a Security Improvement Initiative (SII) project 
which concentrated on the initiation and design phases of the software development project lifecycle. This 
organization uses a customized plan driven document centric waterfall approach when conducting Web application 
development and all other forms of software-based initiatives. Within this process approach the business comes up 
with an idea and develops a business case to support the project. Once the business case is accepted, then, a 
project manager is assigned to the project.
The project manager contacts the necessary personnel to have resources assigned to the project. In general, these 
individuals include the architect and, possibly, a project risk analyst. The architect is responsible for completing a 
Design Architecture Document (DAD) and presenting it to the Design Architecture Committee (DAC). There are 
eight voting members on this committee; all have veto authority. If any of the members on the committee vetoes the 
project, the design is rejected and has to be resubmitted with identified committee objections addressed. It should be 
noted that all the members had established their seats on the board months before the SII was initiated.
Based on member voting, there are three possible outcomes when a DAD is submitted to the DAC. First, the DAD 
could be accepted by the committee. Second, the DAD could be accepted by the committee with conditions. Third, 
the DAD could be rejected. Once the design is approved, the coding teams produce a Detail Design Document 
(DDD) based on the DAD. This design is then built, tested, and implemented into the production environment under 
the governance of the architect. All voting members have the right to assign conditions within their area of expertise. 
If a DAD is accepted with conditions, these conditions must be satisfied prior to progression into the next stage, 
which in this case would be the build stage. An interesting gage to examine the effects of security on the overall 
development process is the quarterly analysis of the assigned security conditions.
The organization has customized the individual phases within this approach by subdividing them into stages. The 
application of the WES developmental methodology up to DAC approval is shown in Table 2: WES Implementation. 
This table reveals how the process should operate in the first two project phases of the application development 
lifecycle, the associated generic project stages, and the phases of the WES methodology. The section of the table 
titled ‘WES Applied Project Stages’ specifically details the integration of the WES methodology with the company’s 
generic project stages. The application of the WES methodology is conducted in conjunction with the knowledge 
derived from the survey as summarized in Appendix 1.
The application of WES reveals the opportunity to implement multiple changes to the development process. The 
group most receptive to the idea of changes to the development process was the architecture group. The Design 
Architecture Document (DAD) is the primary instrument utilized by the architecture team in the organization. Hence, 
the logical place to implement changes is the DAD.
It should be noted that the WES methodology does not mandate deliverables from the individual areas within the 
methodology. The methodology lets the organization determine what is appropriate, based on the size of the 
organization, the application development methodology that is being utilized, and the corporate culture. In this 
particular case study, the organization in question is already documentation heavy. Hence, the realistic approach is 
to expand the current documentation so that it incorporates the new security functionality. The organization already 
produces a Business Case Document (BCD), Design Architecture Document (DAD), a Detail Design Document 
(DDD), and Testing Documentation (TD).
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Table 2: WES Implementation
Project 
Phases






Project Development Risk Assessment 
(Cost/Risk/Effort/Probability of Success) 
Data Protection Legislation, Attack Trees 
Risk Analysis Techniques
Design Business Requirements Application Security Requirements








Security Design (Effectively Secure Individual Security 
Requirements)
Satisfactorily address risk identified in risk assessment and 
application security requirements
Verify security requirement compliancy with organizational 
compatibility
Establish intended use of W3C Standards, Coding Practices
Describe the Establishment of Secure Data, Establishment of
Accountability and Trust
State the use of Standards (Encryption, Architecture, 
Infrastructure)









Build Construction (DDD) Security Coding
(Effectively Secure Individual Security Requirements)
Implement W3C Standards, Coding Practices, Code Reviews 
Secure Data, Establishment of Accountability and Trust, 
Utilization of Reusable Components





(Prompt, Rigorous, Security Testing and Evaluation)
Application Testing
Verification of risk and requirements satisfaction
Incident Management
Disaster Recovery Management
Implement Implementation Deployment in Production
Personnel Availability
Production Deployment Verification




Project Development and Risk Analysis
During concept development, the project risk analyst should be conducting a risk analysis. The Project Risk Analyst 
should also be speaking simultaneously with the architect and the appropriate coding teams in order to determine 
the project risk and help the business unit develop the project’s business case. The results of the survey support the 
need for early interaction between the business unit and the technical side of the organization. An issue that should 
be addressed during the risk analysis is the risk compatibility. The application of the WES methodology indicates 
that the risk analysis should be determining critical functionality within the application, determining appropriate 
service levels, identifying all possible threats, the probability of attack, the probability of success, and the cost 
associated with the desired level of protection [Phaltankar, 2000].
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Application Security Requirements
When the business requirements are being gathered, members of the business unit should be interacting with the 
project manager, the architect, a project risk analyst, and members from appropriate coding teams. The idea behind 
this interaction is to gather a fairly comprehensive listing of the security requirements. Specific security requirements 
explicitly recognize all the security requirements from the business unit so that they can be addressed successfully. 
The security requirements should identify specific environmental requirements along with addressing identity, 
authentication, and authorization. Once the security requirements are gathered, they should be examined from a 
critical perspective in order to determine how they will comply with the organization’s security policy, corporate 
culture and technology compatibility.
Security Design
Once the security requirements have been ascertained and they have been examined in reference to the security 
policy, corporate culture, and technology compatibility, the design should take place with this information in mind. 
The proposed design improvements concentrated on the architecture team’s main instrument for creating solutions, 
which is the Design Architecture Document (DAD). The following changes were proposed to the design process, and 
some of them are reflected in the DAD.
1. Owner/Creator Contact Information
2. Conversation Checklist for Security Requirements Gathering
3. Signature Section






The idea behind capturing the owner-creator information, the conversion checklist for security requirements 
gathering, and the signature section, is not only to expedite communication but to assign accountability. Regardless 
of the existence of questions around various topics in the document, it is necessary to assign ownership of the 
proposed architecture solution. The owner/creator information tells anyone, who picks up the documented solution, 
who created the solution’s architecture.
Conversation Checklist for Security Requirements Gathering
The conversation checklist, for security requirements gathering, helps aid the project manager to ensure that all of 
the necessary parties are involved in the creation of the DAD and in the overall project. This, realistically, should be 
the job of the project manager. However, the survey and observation alludes to the fact that the skill level among the 
project managers in the organization varies widely. The goal of having the conversation checklist for the security 
requirements is that there is increased communication with the project members encouraging a higher level of 
security awareness.
Signature Section
The proposed signature section consisted of three names: the project manager, the individual in the business unit 
who was responsible for signing off on the business requirements, and the individual on the DAC who is responsible 
for matching the design to the actual product prior to going into production. (The present system lacked this crucial 
functionality). The project managers should be included in the DAD since the document is being created at their 
request. The inclusion of the project manager in this process will help educate management on the design process 
and help foster solution buy-in; including the name and the contact information for the individual who is responsible 
for providing approved user requirements helps to encourage communication when there are questions and to 
assign responsibility. The DAC signature should list the individual (and his/her contact information) who has agreed 
to follow up on the proposed application to verify that the application being delivered is the same as the application 
that was proposed in the design submitted to the DAC. This signature provides member and application 
accountability to the DAC.
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Risk Compatibility Section
The idea behind the Risk Compatibility section stage is to ensure that the security design proposed by the architect 
is compatible with the Risk team’s policy requirements. A Risk Compatibility section examines tier trust policy 
compatibility, proposed low level security practices, and data security. The trust model is the foundation for the 
policies that are put into place in an organization. Hence, applications can be applied to the policies or the trust 
model in order to determine compliancy. The reality is that both should be checked for each solution so that there is 
a system of checks and balances. This insures that the solution is compatible with the organization trust model and 
policies, while verifying that there are no discrepancies between the policies and the trust model.
The trust model compliance can be examined from two perspectives. The first is the network architecture 
perspective and the second is the application architecture perspective. The architect would need to learn the 
organization’s network architecture trust model and the application trust model. An assessment of an organization’s 
trust models naturally leads to a discussion about new application integration into both architecture models, making 
sure to identify any violations to the model and the acquisition of appropriate exception authorizations.
Examples of the issues that the application should address would include:
• Assurance that the application does not violate the Internet network trust model
• That the application uses the organization’s Identity Management (IM) system, and, if not, explain why not, 
and acquires the necessary exception
• How does the application establish direct trust?
• How does the application maintain trust?
• Does the application implement proper encryption policies? Do these policies comply with the Internet 
network trust model?
Another point that surfaced with the application of the WES methodology is an overview of the application and its 
impact on the organization’s low-level security practices. The idea behind identifying the proposed low-level security 
practices is to ensure that the application’s low-level practices are compatible with established security policies. If 
they are not compatible, they have to be acknowledged appropriately. Example: An application that has to have 
access to the kernel level of a UNIX box would need to be acknowledged via an appropriate risk analysis. If the risk 
is deemed a necessary risk, the appropriate exceptions would have to be sought and granted within the 
organization. The thought behind data security is that the organization needs to identify any sensitive data held 
within the proposed system design. The organization also needs to document that this data is being protected by 
successfully addressing appropriate risk encryption policies, transaction policies, and storage policies.
Identity Management
Identity is a key factor in establishing and maintaining the security of a system. The physical world places multiple 
meanings on the term identity depending on the context to which it is applied [Mont, Bramhall, Gittler, Pato, et al., 
2002]. These meanings include everything from names to addresses, to financial information, to citizenship [Mont et 
al., 2002]. “‘Digital identity’ is, at the core, an effort to recreate, organise, automate and integrate all those aspects in 
the online electronic world and (increasingly) link them to existing ‘offline’ identities” [Mont et al., 2002]. Hence, 
Identity Management (IM) has the potential to impact business processes, policies, and the organization’s 
technology in order to attempt to provide access and user control to Web applications. “In this context, identity 
management is also a key e-business enabler: being able to recognize the digital identity of people and Web 
services, to understand, manage and validate their profiles and rights is fundamental in order to underpin 
accountability in business relationships and enable commercial transactions” [Mont et al., 2002]. As far as the 
organization is concerned, IM should be viewed as a re-useable component within the organization. Under the IM 
heading, architects should be addressing issues such as role-based access and controls, authentication and 
authorization, user provisioning, access and control to environments, as well as audit and archive design.
Threat Management
Threat Management attempts to identify all the known threats to the proposed solution and how these threats are 
being mitigated. This solution should also take into consideration interaction with existing software like host-based 
intrusion detection systems, network-based intrusion-detection systems, firewalls, and antivirus software. Another 
area that needs attention is the use of any compliance tools that are being utilized by the organization and the 
solution’s compatibility with the current configuration of the organization.
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Trust Model
Trust is critical when establishing security. The architect should describe how trust will be established and 
maintained between the various application tiers. Another issue that needs to be addressed is how deep a user’s 
identification (id) can be traced within the application. This helps the organization identify a level of risk that it is 
willing to live with when it comes to identifying the actions of a user.
DAD Socialization
The organization has an interesting environment where the architect is supposed to formalize a solution with all of 
the members of the group. To formalize a solution with the members of the Design Architecture Committee (DAC) 
means that the architect meets with each member individually to discuss the proposed solution. This gives the 
architect and the group member the opportunity to work out any issues prior to the formal DAC meeting. However, 
observation indicated that this was not taking place effectively. The proposed solution to the problem is built on the 
idea that improved communication improves overall security. Hence, a mandatory socialization table that included 
the names and titles of all of the voting members of the DAC was implemented in the Design Architecture Document 
(DAD).
Implementation Results
As a general indicator of the effectiveness of the Security Improvement Initiative (SII), all of the conditions assigned 
to new and existing projects during the SII were captured for analysis. The numbers used in the observations are 
simply very general indicators as to the impact of the SII and nothing more. When the observations first started the 
security conditions appeared to be on the rise and then they appeared to decrease for the remainder of the study. 















1st 12 24 12 .5 1
2nd 35 78 17 .45 2.05
3rd 29 77 14 .38 2.07
4th 24 69 17 .35 1.41
5th 18 48 12 .38 1.5
The SII appears to have had a positive effect on the organization by providing a decreasing trend in quarterly 
security conditions assigned to projects. The decreasing security conditions helps to improve overall development 
times by decreasing issues that have to be resolved and reducing tensions between deployment staff and security 
personnel. However, it cannot be claimed that applying WES is the sole cause for the change in the trend. This is 
due to the fact that it is impossible to totally lock down a business environment where multiple groups interact, 
quantify the impact of having a researcher investigating security in a corporate environment, and link results to a 
single action.
Further Implementation
Due to the focus of the SII, the WES methodology was not implemented to the balance of the application 
development lifecycle. However, it was applied to highlight areas where the organization could focus future security 
improvement initiative projects. Hence, the application of the WES project indicated that the build phase should 
verify that they are addressing the following issues in the area of secure product development: Authentication 
Development, Authorization Development, Coding Standards, Proper Data Encryption, and the Assignment of 
architects to consult with individual engineering rooms. In the area of Controlled environment testing, it indicated the 
verification of the following: Compliance Testing (CT)—Environment Testing, Assurance Testing (AT)—Certificate 
Testing, Regression Testing, and Load Testing. In the Testing part of the build phase it indicated that the following 
should be verified: Test Scalability/Fail over, Third Party Penetration Testing, Testing Criteria from Solutions Design, 
Testing Scripts from Project Risk, Incident Management, and a Disaster Recovery Plan. The application of the WES 
methodology also suggested that there should be a security sign-off prior to application implementation into 
production. The methodology also suggested that end-user feedback of the security functionality should be sought in 
order to determine security effectiveness and to identify security bugs.
X. SUMMARY
A real world understanding of application security indicates that it is a multifaceted issue in an increasingly complex 
environment. This becomes especially apparent when examining Web-facing applications. The need to address
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security in application development increased over the past several years. However, one of the major challenges 
facing organizations in today’s Web-enabled environment is balancing technological needs with the business needs 
of the organization. Another potential challenge for organizations is structuring the overall development process so 
that there is not a general frustration within the organization in terms of overall process efficiency. A lack of process 
efficiency potentially hinders aggressive Web development from a business perspective. A lack of security 
integration and understanding of the application development process creates an environment that is conducive to 
fostering security deficiencies.
WES is a proactive approach that is designed to operate at a high level of abstraction. There are advantages and 
disadvantages to a high level abstract solution. The advantage that a high-level of abstraction provides is 
inclusiveness to the overall process. A high-level process is naturally conducive to security issues, business issues, 
software development issues, and organizational issues being more inclusive. If these issues are narrowed through 
too much detail, there is the possibility that the details will be biased in some way or that they will simply miss an 
important issue. The disadvantage of an abstract approach to a security methodology is that the implementation of 
the process is demanding from an individual knowledge perspective. WES is constructed from empirical research 
that consisted of two surveys and relevant literature. Empirical research bases the WES methodology in reality, in 
that, the goal of the WES methodology is to strengthen security in Web development applications. The principles of 
security education, good communication, and cultural support provide the foundation for the WES methodology, 
which aims to create an environment that is conducive to initially fostering and continually encouraging security in an 
organization’s application development environment. Due to resource constraints, WES was only partially 
implemented in a large organization. However, it is desirable to complete the WES implementation with the existing 
partner. It would also be desirable to implement WES in other organizations for comparison.
Future research in the area of secure application development is currently examining the development of cloud 
computing applications. The security process in a Fortune 500 organization is currently being examined to determine 
if it is appropriate for cloud computing applications. It is also being scrutinized from the perspective of cloud 
computing forensics. This research seeks to investigate the security controls in cloud computing development 
lifecycles and determine if they are appropriate for a cloud environment. It also investigates the effectiveness of 
existing tools to acquire forensically sound data in cloud environments. Future work is also underway to examine 
security from a large organizational pattern perspective. The idea is to develop security patterns for large businesses 
that can be applied at the organizational level.
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APPENDIX 1: ORGANIZATIONAL SURVEY AND INTERVIEWS
An in-depth survey was conducted during July and August of 2005, at a Global Fortune 500 financial organization, 
which focussed on security. The primary objective of the survey was to determine the areas where security practices 
were being successfully applied and to gain an accurate understanding of the role that security plays in a large 
organization’s application development process. A secondary objective was to establish a base line to identify the 
impact of using WES within the organization.
The Survey Method
Sixteen one-to-one interviews were conducted with selected employees representing a variety of roles with a 
diversity of work experiences within the technical side of the organization. All of the employees were directly 
involved in the application development process and some of these were security specialists. Our aim was to ensure 
that these employees covered all aspects of the software development process.
All interviews were conducted and recorded by one of the authors (Glisson) using an interview template consisting of 
thirty questions. Most of the questions were structured to elicit an initial response (yes/no/do not know) followed by 
supplementary questions to drill down into the reasons for these responses. To comprehend the security challenges, 
the application development process was examined first in order to understand the environment. Then the security 
implications of the environment were scrutinized.
The interview template was split into four parts to:
1. gather information about the interviewee demographics (four questions)
2. understand the application process within the organization, the interviewees’ role in it and their 
understanding of the process (nine questions)
3. focus on the security, the existing security architecture and its perceived strengths and weaknesses (fifteen 
questions)
4. wrap up the interview by getting the interviewees’ feedback on the questions and to give them the 
opportunity to offer any other information they thought was relevant (two questions)
The Interviews
Interviewee Demographics
The first four questions were used to establish the interviewee’s current role in the organization, his/her number of 
years of experience and a brief idea of the individual’s history. These questions revealed that the interviewees were 
experienced IT professionals who had a variety of technology backgrounds and, in general, several years of 
experience. The average number of years of experience among the sixteen respondents was just under fourteen 
years.
The Application Development Process
Question 5 firmly established the existence of a documented application development process. There was some 
discrepancy among individuals regarding the process specifics but the general idea is that the organization uses a 
customized plan driven version of the waterfall approach. The good points identified included providing structure to 
the development environment, being well understood in the organization, providing accountability, and flexibility at 
the more detailed level. The bad points of the process were business time-to-market, heavy documentation, and 
one-size-fits all (nonflexible) approach.
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Question 6 identified the areas in which the interviewees are engaged in the product lifecycle and was used to 
check that we had a good coverage of all relevant development roles.
Question 7 asked about the effectiveness of the application development process. Only six out of sixteen 
interviewees indicated that is effective. Four indicated that it was not successful and six indicated that it was 
successful “Sometimes.”
Out of the four who indicated that the development process is not effective, these individuals indicated that the 
process was not cost effective; too heavy on the documentation, too slow, and applications are chosen based on 
business need and not how they fit with the IT structure. Out of the respondents who indicated effectiveness 
“Sometimes,” they thought that the application development methodology was good for project structure and 
repeating projects. They thought it was not effective when considering time-to-market issues and rapid application 
development needs, introduction of new technology, and the bureaucracy and overheads of the process.
Question 8 asked about the amount of time it takes to get a project from inception to delivery. There was a range of 
answers to the inquiry, but the average was about a year, give or take a couple of months.
Question 9 was about project time lines. Thirteen out of sixteen respondents indicated that they felt that the project 
timelines should be shorter. The reasons behind the desire for a shorter process included the loss of potential 
business opportunities, market competitiveness, and the need to take advantage of new technologies.
Question 10 asked if projects exceeded their estimated time frames. There was unanimous agreement that projects 
exceed estimated time frames within the organization. The reason for exceeding time frames suggested were 
changing business requirements, complex technical environments, lack of technical expertise, inadequate estimation 
techniques, and inexperienced project managers. Fifteen respondents indicated that security issues contributed to 
elongated time frames in some way.
Question 11 explored budget overruns. Fifteen out of sixteen respondents indicated that projects exceed the 
estimated budgets. The main reasons for budget overruns included poor managerial planning, resource issues, and 
changing business requirements. Seven of the respondents indicated that security issues had contributed to budget 
over runs and two indicated that it was possible.
Question 12 asked about the existence of any corporate recommendations in terms of optimal overall time frames 
for development. The effective answer to this question, in the organization, is that one does not explicitly exist. 
However, there may be expectations from various business units and timeframes exist within specific pieces of the 
overall development cycle processes.
Question 13 explored how the in-house development process is used. Eight individuals indicated that projects 
always follow the in-house development project. However, in exploring these answers further, there was some doubt 
about the extent of interviewees’ knowledge of whether the whole process was used. Five of the respondents 
indicated that all projects did not follow the development process. Two of the respondents indicated that it happened 
“Sometimes.”
The “No” responders indicated that reasons included people attempting to circumvent the process, critical time 
scales, and poor project planning. One point of interest that did surface during this line of questioning is the fact that 
after the design approval by Design Architecture Committee the development process has the potential to break 
down and be discarded in the name of project completion. The individuals who answered “Sometimes” indicate that 
it is up to the project manager to follow the development process and that exceptions have been made in the past in 
order to get around following the methodology.
The Role of Security
Question 14 attempted to ascertain what individuals in the industry feel a security development process should 
contain. There was a wide range of answers for this question with several answers indicating that the security 
development process should contain specific stages of the development lifecycle. Additional answers also indicated 
best practices, guidelines, communication, training, and accountability. All of these are valid responses, however, 
the lack of a clear, straightforward answer indicates a potential discrepancy in the definition of the term security and 
the interpretation of the phrase a security development process within the organization.
Question 15 was designed to determine areas where security is not engaged in the existing development lifecycle. 
The results indicated that there are clear deficiencies in security visibility within the overall development process.
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Security is severely lacking in the business analysis stage. Clearly, there were issues with security in the evaluation, 
maintenance, and evolution stages. Slightly less emphasis was given to security issues in the testing and 
deployment stages, but it could be argued that there is a potential problem or perception of a problem, in these 
stages as well. In fact, the only two stages where security is clearly perceived to be involved in the development 
process are the requirements and the design stages.
Question 16 ascertained the number of people who think there is a documented security development process and 
explored the strengths and weaknesses of this process. The company does actually have a documented security 
process maintained by the Project Security team. The responses revealed that the knowledge of the document is 
restricted to specific groups, and only five interviewees were aware of it.
The good points of the security development process include high structure that helps to provide documentation. 
The highly structured process creates an environment that is conducive to audits and future reference needs. The 
documentation was also listed as a drawback to the process along with explicitly making one group responsible for 
security verses making everyone responsible for security. Security awareness was one point that was mentioned 
that still needs to be developed within the organization.
The problems that were discussed with the current security process included a lack of emphasis on the employee, a 
lack of utilization of the current process, a lack of security involvement after the design has been signed off, a lack of 
security awareness, and a lack of stakeholder buy-in to security. The point of breakdown appears to be around the 
entire development process. The process takes too long. The business has the power to circumvent the process to 
keep projects on track from a timeline and budget perspective, while a shortage of personnel and problems around 
post-implementation and change management need to be addressed.
The general thought behind the lack of a security process within the organization seemed to be that the individuals 
involved in security do not record the process; they just do what needs to be done. These people are viewed as a 
resource and are accessed as needed during the development process. However, there is some confusion over 
when and where the Security Team actually gets involved in the process. This is taken to the point that it is viewed 
as the solutions designers’ problem. There is also the view that security is a bolt-on issue that is addressed after the 
coding is complete. Hence, the organization is giving security only lip service and not truly pursuing a security 
architecture infrastructure.
Question 17 attempted to determine how applications are deemed secure within the organization. There were a 
variety of answers to this query. The answers identified a number of different parts of the application process: 
requirements, security policies and standards, process, testing, audits, and reviews.
Expanding on these points: Requirements referred to the business and technical application requirements. The 
Security team sets the security policies and standards and industry standards are used to help ensure security 
within the organization. Process referred to the creation of the Design Architecture Document and submitting it to the 
Design Architecture Committee. Testing referred to internal penetration testing and third party testing.
Question 18 asked how an application is deemed secure from a development perspective. The result is that testing 
is subjective and tailored around the needs of the application based on the functional and non-functional 
requirements. The general rule is that high-risk applications require more testing and third-party testing. Outwardly 
facing applications are more rigorously tested than inwardly facing applications.
Question 19 was used to determine the stakeholders who are responsible for security at the various stages of the 
development lifecycle. The results from this question indicate that there is a lot of confusion about who is 
responsible for what and at what stages of the lifecycle. The responses from the participants indicate that the 
Security Team is perceived to have the most responsibility through the various stages of the development lifecycle. 
However, many other answers were given in response to this question. This confusion over which stakeholders are 
responsible for security supports the results obtained from question fifteen where there were clearly areas in the 
development lifecycle where security is not involved in the process. If you do not know which stakeholders are 
responsible for the security, it stands to reason that it would be difficult to know where security is involved in the 
process.
Question 20 was designed to try to pinpoint a specific individual role that is responsible for security within the 
organization. Eleven of the respondents indicated that there was an individual responsible for security within the 
organization and of these some form of the Security Team was identified by name six times.
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Question 21 attempted to determine if conflicts arise between the stakeholders and the individuals responsible for 
security. Fourteen of the respondents indicated that conflicts arise between the two groups. The types of conflicts 
were financial and time constraints, or conflicts over security solutions. The disagreement over the security solution 
appears to have its roots in the perception of the level of risk that is perceived with an application. Hence, a higher 
level of risk would necessitate a stronger security solution. This disagreement over risk assessment occurs between 
the business unit and the application developers.
Question 22 was designed to determine the extent contractors are used in the organization and to determine if they 
present a major risk to the organization. The initial result is that the company uses contractors very heavily. There 
was only one group that did not use contractors. The majority of the respondents indicated that contractors are held 
to the same application development methodology as employees. If they do use a different process, the process is 
examined and approved by the proper individuals within the organization. The majority of the respondents indicated 
that contractors are also held to the same security requirements as employees. However, reading between the lines 
in conversation, the organization does not do the testing for them on the applications that they are building. Hence, 
there is the underlying possibility that there could be discrepancies in application testing. How effectively this is 
monitored appears to be up to the project manager.
Question 23 sought the interviewee’s opinion on the emphasis security is given within the organization. The 
answers to this question were widely varied. Some individuals thought that the emphasis on security was strong, 
due to outside factors such as legislation, while others felt that the emphasis was weak. Two individuals felt that the 
emphasis had improved over the past several months while others felt that the security focus is misaligned with the 
application development process. Some individuals felt that security played a large role in the organization while 
others felt that the emphasis was small and that security is effectively seen as an inhibitor rather than an enabler in 
the development process.
Question 24 was designed to determine if the elements of the existing in-house security process are always 
followed. Seven of the sixteen respondents indicated that it was not always followed. The reasons for not following 
the security process included: time pressures; bureaucracy; lack of awareness; and a lack of security involvement in 
certain aspects of the process. Other reasons that were mentioned included the complete lack of a security process 
and where the application sits, i.e., does the application face the Internet or is it internal.
Question 25 revealed that the majority of the individuals who were surveyed (eleven out of sixteen) felt that security 
should play a larger role in the organization’s development environment. The reasons these individuals gave for the 
security role needing to be larger mainly concerned the nature of the business. They indicated that the organization 
is relatively small in the financial world, and protection of the reputation is critical. In the current environment, 
security can be de-scoped for numerous reasons, integrating security into the development process up front would 
cut development overhead and increase security awareness within the organization.
Question 26 asked whether there was a job-related impact for not following the development security process. The 
responses were: eight felt there was no impact, six thought there was, and two did not know.
Question 27 attempted to determine the areas that require a greater or reduced emphasis on security within the 
company process. There were a variety of answers, but there were some recurring themes, all identifying areas 
requiring greater emphasis: four interviewees talked about business requirements, four interviewees talked about 
education, and five interviewees talked about testing. These themes indicate that there are problems with these 
areas in the organization.
Question 28 asked about the major security threats during application development. Common themes included 
requirements/design/implementation/testing (seven answers), people and behavior (three), policy circumvention and 
enforcement (two), and viruses (two).
There were a variety of answers to the supplementary question inquiring which of these issues are being met by the 
existing process, which ranged from “None” to “All.” A theme that did surface in a few of the answers is that 
separation of duty between code reviews and testing is sufficient within the organization. There were several “None” 
responses to the further question asking which issues the existing process was not satisfying. Other answers 
included a lack of documentation, internal and external coding issues, and a lack of security in the solution design.
Wrap Up Questions
Question 29 was included to analyze the survey instrument. Eight individuals indicated that there were no questions 
that were vague or difficult to follow. Three individuals indicated that there was some confusion over the term 
application development versus the term that the organization uses that is “product lifecycle.” One individual thought 
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that question 23 was difficult to follow and prevented him from delivering a clean concise response. Two individuals 
thought that there were a lot of questions about a security development process that does not exist.
Question 30 allowed interviewees to add any additional comments that they feel are relevant to the survey. Five of 
the interviewees did not have any additional information to offer. The answers from the balance of the responders 
were extremely varied. Their answers included discussing interviewee backgrounds, general discussions about the 
survey, the definition of security and the skill sets and training of employees.
Conclusions
The organization uses a customized plan driven waterfall approach to govern all projects at the higher levels, 
including Web-based applications. The practical environment operates in the following way. The business gets a 
project idea approved through a business analysis process, which is followed by a business requirements stage. At 
that point a project manager from the technical side of the organization is assigned to the project. The project 
manager acquires an architect from the architecture team, who is charged with the task of creating a high-level 
design that meets the business requirements, that fits into the existing organization’s infrastructure and is acceptable 
by all relevant parties. The main tool that is used to complete this task is the Design Architecture Document (DAD). 
Depending on the size of the project the architect can create a preliminary DAD and then a final DAD for really large 
projects, or the architect can create a one-time DAD for small-to-medium projects.
The DAD is then presented to the Design Architecture Committee (DAC) for approval. At this point the DAC can do 
one of three things. They can approve the design, approve the design with conditions, or reject the design. If the 
design is approved, it moves on to the appropriate team to implement the solution using a conventional cycle of 
code, code reviews, testing, and evaluation. If it is approved with caveats, it is up to the architect who created the 
DAD to satisfy the condition so that the project can move on to the implementation stage. If any member of the DAC 
rejects the design, the architect must go back to the drawing board and try again.
It is questionable as to whether the development process was always followed. The survey revealed that the 
individual teams that actually implemented the projects used their own methodologies. These methodologies have 
been customized so that they can meet the deliverables mandated by the high-level plan-driven waterfall approach 
and meet timescales required by the business. Realistically, the organization was operating two different 
approaches to application development at different levels within the organization. The high-level approach was a 
customized version of the plan-driven waterfall approach. The low-level approach consisted of a number of ad-hoc 
processes contrived by the individual coding teams. After going through a formal design approval process 
(DAD/DAC), there was no verification that the design implemented in production is the design that was originally 
approved.
The general indication from the interviewee answers was that projects exceed estimated budgets and timeframes on 
a fairly regular basis. Interviewee answers also indicated that the current application development process is not 
effective when considering time-to-market issues, rapid application development needs, and the introduction of new 
technology, resulting in a lack of efficiency.
The results of the survey indicated that there are areas within the organization’s development process that are 
experiencing deficiencies in security and need to be addressed. The existing DAD did address some security issues. 
An application’s security requirements must be listed in a table along with a description of how they are being 
satisfied. The description of how these requirements are being met should include a discussion on how the 
proposed solution addresses confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The current document also addresses backup 
and recovery, purge and archive of information, and disaster recovery plans. However, it was not clear how these 
issues were addressed during implementation and what steps were taken to verify that appropriate actions had been 
taken.
Security Education
The organization generally emphasises the importance of security because of the nature of its business. There is a 
well-defined security policy, but many developers seem to be unaware of this. There is clearly a failure to ensure 
that security policies are disseminated throughout the organization from senior management. There is also a feeling 
among developers that security is the responsibility of the security team and, thus, security is somebody else’s 
problem. So there is a clear need for security education for the IT employees, emphasising that security is 
everybody’s problem and that there is an organizational security policy.
Volume 34 Article 71
1395
Job-related Impact for Not Following Security Processes
The perceived lack of any job-related impact for not following security processes is another example of the feeling 
that security is not the responsibility of the developers. If there is no accountability for failures to follow correct 
procedures, there is no incentive to fully adhere to these procedures.
Integration of Security with the Application Development Process
Currently, security is seen as a separate process “bolted on” to the development process. Code reviews and testing 
are seen as being important aspects of the development process, but these do not seem to be explicitly linked to 
security requirements. It is particularly disturbing that security issues were not perceived to be a fundamental part of 
the Business Requirements stage at the beginning of the development process. Conflicts between the business 
stakeholders and the security specialists also suggest that there is not a clearly defined process for risk analysis. 
The statement that security is seen as an inhibitor rather than an enabler in the development process suggests that 
any specified security requirements may not be fully implemented. All these points indicate that security issues need 
to be integrated into the application development process from the beginning and throughout all stages, and that the 
security specialists need to be more actively engaged with the developers and not seen as a separate group 
inhibiting the development process.
A detailed analysis of the survey results and how these contributed to the creation of the Security Criteria for Web 
Application Development (SCAWD) has been previously published [Glisson et al., 2006b].
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